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ABSTRACT

More Than Hatchetmen: Chinese Exclusion and Tong Wars in Portland, Oregon
by
Brenda M. Horrocks, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Dr. Colleen O’Neill
Department: History

During the middle to late nineteenth century, Chinese immigration hit record
levels in the United States. This led to the growth of Chinatowns across the West Coast.
Many citizens and government leaders argued that Chinese immigrants posed a threat to
the American way of life and took jobs away from white men. These fears stoked antiChinese sentiment and were driving factors for riots and massacres protesting Chinese
immigrants. The Sinophobia culminated in the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in
1882, which strictly limited Chinese immigration. To help adjust to a new country,
increased limitations on their labor, and widespread discrimination, Chinese immigrants
created associations centered on addressing the needs and providing services denied to
them by local and federal government. One type of group formed, known as tongs,
particularly focused on physical and economic protection. Historically, examination of
the tongs reduced them to criminals, referring to them as the gangs of Chinatown. This
thesis shows that tongs were more complicated and played an important role in
Chinatown. They provided protection for their members, legal assistance when necessary,
and helped men find employment. Tongs often fought one another in conflicts known as
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tong wars during the late nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries. Looking at
Portland’s 1917 Tong War, this thesis examines how local government, tongs, and other
Chinese organizations fought one another for control of Chinatown. During the 1920s,
tong wars declined and by the late 1930s, tong wars ceased to exist. Tong wars ended due
to the improved circumstances of Chinese immigrants and their descendants.
Individually, and as groups, Chinese immigrants fought against prejudice in their jobs
and communities. They hired lawyers and fought discrimination in the courts. Federal
and local legislative changes took place, including the overturn of the Chinese Exclusion
Act by 1943, which allowed for new immigration and the opportunity for immigrants to
become citizens. As members relied less and less on tongs for protection and assistance,
most tongs transitioned from being key pillars in Chinatown to simple fraternal orders.
This work broadens understanding of immigrant communities and the responses of
immigrants to discrimination.

(113 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

More Than Hatchetmen: Chinese Exclusion and Tong Wars in Portland, Oregon
Brenda M. Horrocks

During the middle of the nineteenth century, vast numbers of Chinese immigrants
arrived on the west coast of the United States. Here, they sought a better life for
themselves and their families back home. The new arrivals often became targets of
violence and discrimination as anti-Chinese sentiment grew in the country. Chinese
immigrants protected and provided for themselves by creating a variety of organizations
in their communities. One such organization became known as the tong. Many groups
organized themselves around family names, regional background, or employment, but
tongs accepted anyone who wanted to join. The promise of physical protection, economic
gain, and acceptance in a community incentivized many Chinese men to join tongs.
Tongs provided a space in which Chinese men could reclaim masculinity and practice
traditional gender roles. Faced with discrimination, physical abuse, marginalization, and
governmental neglect, tongs filled the power vacuum in Chinese communities. Tongs
became powerful leaders within Chinatowns across the West. Beginning in the 1880s,
tongs clashed with one another in events known as tong wars. By 1930, the era of tong
wars came to an end. Once the powerhouse of the Chinese community, tong influence
declined as Chinese residents successfully gained recognition, and fought back against
racism and legislative discrimination. During the twentieth century, tongs transitioned
from groups focused on economic gain (often through vice) and physical protection of its
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members to a fraternal order within Chinatown. Examination of tongs, tong wars, and the
reasons for their decline creates greater understanding of Chinese communities and a
broader understanding of how immigrant communities respond to discrimination within
communities, and denied governmental protection and assistance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The War of the Tongs, a film featuring an all Chinese cast, first premiered on
February 19, 1917. The movie was written by a Chinese American and shot in San
Francisco’s Chinatown. The film follows Wong Wing, a tea merchant’s clerk, as he falls
in love with a girl named Suey Lee. Another man, Chin Ting, a rich landlord and head of
a local Chinese fraternal association known as a tong, also desires Suey Lee. This
struggle grows and becomes the central conflict between the opposing tongs. A tong war
breaks out as fighting ensues between the two groups, resulting in the death of several
men, and only in the final moments is Suey Lee saved from Chin Ting by her lover.1
Ironically, the film portrayed a romanticized version of a very real conflict taking
place only one state away. At the time of the film’s debut, fighting in Portland’s
Chinatown between the allied tongs Hip Sings and Bow Leongs against the Hop Sings
and Suey Sings was already well under way. Sparked by a skirmish in Portland in early
February, the tong war of 1917 quickly spread through Chinatowns across the West
Coast. War of the Tongs portrayed a glamorized version of tong wars. The film depicted
tong wars as moral battles, fighting for true love, the involvement restricted to tong
members, and devoid of outside participants. However, the reality of tongs and tong wars
proved messier. Fighting often broke out over debts, Chinatown residents often found
themselves in the crossfire, and local government frequently involved themselves in the
conflict.

Bruce Calvert, “War of the Tongs,” The Silent Film Still Archive, Last modified April 2, 2008.
https://www.silentfilmstillarchive.com/war_of_the_tongs.htm.
1
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This thesis seeks to explore the Chinese associations known as tongs, the reasons
for their existence, and the roles they played within Chinatowns during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Simplistically classifying tongs as the criminal component of
Chinatown ignores the important contributions of tongs to their communities.2 I argue
that tongs provided an important role in the community by checking government
overreach. Tongs also provided physical protection for its members, which local law
enforcement routinely denied them.
Tongs developed as a response to the pervasive hostility and discrimination that
greeted Chinese immigrants upon their arrival to the United States. Denied fair wages,
access to labor, and equal standing before the law, Chinese immigrants turned inward for
protection and assistance, creating a variety of associations. While many groups
organized around a family name, or status, the tongs offered a more egalitarian approach
as they accepted members regardless of their socioeconomic background and independent
of family names.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the majority of tongs
participated in numerous illegal activities, including opium smuggling, gambling, and
illegal immigration. Disagreements frequently arose between tongs over control of these
ventures. Often disagreements developed into physical confrontations known as tong
wars that lasted anywhere from a few days to several months. However, during the 1920s
and 30s, the wars declined rapidly and then stopped. I argue that tong wars ended due to

Scott D. Seligman, Tong Wars: The Untold Story of Vice, Money, and Murder in New York’s Chinatown
(New York: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2016). In his book, Seligman focuses on the
illegal activities of tongs, the violence of tong wars, and the need for local government to bring an end to it.
2
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Chinese residents successfully fighting against discrimination, both on group and
individual levels, in the courts as well as the workplace. Combating discrimination not
only brought an end to tong wars, but also altered the nature of tongs themselves. As
members ceased turning to their tongs for assistance, most evolved into simpler fraternal
organizations.
The first chapter of this thesis centers on the beginning of Chinese immigration to
the western United States, discussing the discrimination immigrants faced at work and in
communities, along with the legislative restrictions placed upon them. As the Chinese
immigrant population increased in the west, so did anti-Chinese sentiment. As
disgruntled workers argued that Chinese immigrants stole jobs from white workers and
posed a threat to communities, angry citizens rioted, protesting the presence of Chinese.
The sinophobia of the era also developed into violent action against the Chinese, as
massacres of Chinese residents occurred in parts of California, Wyoming, and Oregon
during the late nineteenth century. Surrounded by a hostile environment, many Chinese
residents learned English, joined Christian churches, and assumed western styles of dress
and grooming. However, the groups that Chinese immigrants organized themselves into
proved to be the most successful avenue for Chinese immigrants to survive, and for some,
to prosper within society.
The second chapter covers the creation of the first tong and the subsequent growth
of tongs in the United States. Early on the group known as the Chinese Six Companies
operated as one of the most powerful Chinese organizations in the western United States.
However, dissatisfied with its preferential treatment for select family groups, a merchant
named Mock Wah formed the Kwong Dock Tong along with a small group of men. The
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Kwong Dock Tong is recognized as the first tong. From here tongs continued to grow and
more than fifteen existed by the end of the nineteenth century.3 I argue that tongs served a
multitude of purposes for Chinese residents, both revealing and filling the failings of
local government in providing for new immigrants. Tongs promised men, and their
families, physical and legal protection, gainful employment, and a brotherhood. Tongs
allowed men to reclaim masculinity and traditional gender norms in a society that
restricted their labor and ability to create families. Using the case study of Portland’s
Tong War of 1917, this chapter examines tong wars and the impact of them on
Chinatowns. Not only did rival tongs fight against one another, but against the local
government as well as it used the tong war as a pretext to crackdown on Chinatown, often
using extralegal methods to control the region.
Chapter three continues the examination of Portland’s 1917 Tong War, as the war
entered the courtroom with cases being heard against tong members. A few months later
the tongs signed a peace pact effectively ending the war. I argue that the peace pact held
for a number of reasons, but primarily because the tongs themselves initiated and
controlled the peace negotiations, rather than having it forced on them by government
leaders.
Although a few more conflicts occurred during the next decade, tongs wars
quickly became a memory, rather than a reality of life. Historians have argued a variety
of reasons to explain the end of the tong war era. Seligman claims that tong wars ended

3

Eng Gong and Bruce Grant, Tong War! (New York: Nicholas L. Brown, 1930), 5.
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due to the Great Depression coupled with a demographic shift.4 While the Great
Depression brought about dramatic changes throughout all parts of American society,
tong wars were already in decline previous to the Great Depression. As such, this
economic argument fails to explain what initiated the downturn. However, sources reveal
a more foundational reason for the end of tong wars. I contend that tong wars ended
chiefly because the political and social situation of Chinese immigrants changed. Federal
legislation began to change, and in 1943 President Roosevelt brought an end to Chinese
exclusion when he signed the Magnuson Act. Likewise, this act allowed for Chinese
immigrants to become U.S. citizens. Chinese residents pushed back against
discrimination in the courtroom and the work force. As the twentieth century progressed,
public opinion of Chinese immigrants changed, they gained better access to jobs and fair
wages, and ability to integrate in communities. Once the powerhouse of the Chinese
community, tong influence declined as Chinese residents successfully gained recognition,
and fought back against racism and legislative discrimination.
Most history texts on Chinese immigration to the United States include a
discussion of ‘tongs.’ At times, the author spends a couple pages discussing the nature
and activities of tongs. Other times, tongs are briefly covered, simplistically described as
the criminal groups in Chinatown.5 However, the existence of tongs and the roles they

Scott D. Seligman, Tong Wars: The Untold Story of Vice, Money, and Murder in New York’s Chinatown
(New York: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2016), 258.
5
There is an absence of real discussion of tongs in Mary Roberts Coolidge’s Chinese Immigration (New
York: Henry Holt & Company, 1909). Erika Lee does not address tongs in her work, At America’s Gates:
Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882-194 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2003). Lucy Salyer’s work conflates tongs with triads and gangs. As this thesis will show, these are
separate groups. Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigration and the Shaping of Modern
Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 40-41. Exceptions to this are
Marie Rose Wong and Sucheng Chan. Marie Rose Wong, Sweet Cakes, Long Journey: The Chinatowns of
4
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played within Chinatowns during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are much more
complex. As tongs played a vital role in Chinatowns in relation to the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association, local government, and individual residents, more
research is needed on tongs themselves. Rather than being typecast as the worst parts of
Chinatown, historians need to address the nuanced existence of tongs. Yes, they were
involved in illicit businesses, violence, and at times corruption. However, they also
provided a way for many Chinese men, unable to make ends meet, to make more money
to provide for themselves and their families. They also provided legal counsel and
representation for members when necessary, this is especially important as the cost of
lawyers was often well beyond the financial capabilities of most individuals. This allows
for greater understanding in why ethnic societies are created and what purposes they
serve in minority populations and communities.
Chinese immigration is a well-developed field of study in history. Early on,
California became home to one of the largest Chinese populations in the United States
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, centered in San Francisco’s Chinatown. In
the past most scholarly works on Chinese immigration focused on California and then
generalized those experiences to the rest of Chinese residents in the West. However,
more recent historians, like Marie Rose Wong, in her work Sweet Cakes, Long Journey:
The Chinatowns of Portland Oregon, examines the experience of Chinese immigrants
outside of San Francisco and California showing the ways in which their experiences
were similar and different to those in California. California centric history fails to explain

Portland, Oregon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004). Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An
Interpretive History (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991).
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the population growth Wong reveals in Portland during the Exclusion Era, nor does it
recognize that enforcement of the Exclusion Act varied across location and the people in
charge.6 As historian Marie Rose Wong argues, the enforcement of the Exclusion Act
was not properly funded, nor did it have sufficient oversight to maintain uniformity in its
execution. Focusing on Portland, this thesis examines the 1917 Tong War and how tongs,
other Chinese organizations, and the local government all fought for control of
Chinatown.
Transnationalism has also furthered the field of immigration studies. Historians
such as Fredy González, Kornel Chang, and Grace Peña Delgado emphasize the
importance of borderlands between the United States and Mexico, as well as between the
United States and Canada.7 These works are crucial for understanding the impact
different nations had on immigration and the ways that borderlands were used to
circumvent exclusion in the United States. The region around the nation’s borders
became important areas for tong activities involving drugs and human smuggling.
Conflating all Chinese immigrant experiences to those found in California
homogenizes Chinese immigrant identity and neglects regional difference, particularly
during the Exclusion Era. The portrayal of Chinese residents, in the United States, as a
uniform group also perpetuates stereotypes that simplistically divides the community into

6

Marie Rose Wong, Sweet Cakes, Long Journey: The Chinatowns of Portland, Oregon (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 2004), 7. Most historians write only that Chinatowns shrank. Wong successfully
argues against this showing that although it was rare, it did occur in Portland’s Chinatown.
7
Fredy González, Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico (Oakland:
University of California Press, 2017). Kornel Chang, Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.Canadian Borderlands (Berkley: University of California Press, 2012). Grace Peña Delgado, Making the
Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2012).
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merchants, launderers, and poor laborers. This limits analysis of the intersection of race
and class; not only within Chinatowns, but throughout the United States, particularly the
role of class in minorities claiming whiteness. Even though most Chinese immigrants to
the United States came from the Guangdong (廣東), province of China, Historian Daniel
Liestman critically argues they were not all the same. Rather, as Liestman contends, the
Guangdong region of China was ethnically diverse and this diversity continued into the
United States as they emigrated.8
While earlier works described Chinese immigrants as passive agents being acted
upon, this thesis emphasizes their agency. I build upon the work of historians like Ronald
Takaki and Erika Lee, in recognizing the group and individual agency of the people
involved.9 However, at times historians portray only group agency, homogenizing the
goals and efforts of Chinese immigrants and Chinatown.10 Rather, more work like Erika
Lee’s is needed, portraying individual agency, along with group agency, and recognizing
that the desires of one Chinatown, did not necessarily reflect the desires of another, or
even all the residents within the Chinatown.11

Daniel Liestman, “Nineteenth-Century Chinese and the Environment of the Pacific Northwest,” The
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 90, no. 1 (Winter, 1998/1999), 17.
9
Mary Roberts Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1909). This work
creates a narrative in which Chinese immigrants simply react, with limited agency, to things happening
around them. Coolidge’s account contrasts sharply with the description provided by Ronald Takaki and
Erika Lee. Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 2nd ed. (New
York: Little, Brown and Company, 1998). Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the
Exclusion Era, 1882-194 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
10
Immigrant agency is visible in the works of Takaki, Wong, and Salyer, but it is a simplified version of
agency that, at times, promotes a false sense of unity within Chinese communities. Ronald Takaki,
Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 2nd ed. (New York: Little, Brown and
Company, 1998). Marie Rose Wong, Sweet Cakes, Long Journey: The Chinatowns of Portland, Oregon
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004). Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigration
and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
11
Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
8

9

The methodology of this thesis focuses on a textual approach, with newspapers,
memoirs, and government records. Where possible this thesis focuses Chinese
perspective itself, rather than an outsider point of view. This follows the practice of
historian Gary Okihiro, who moved beyond the traditional narrative that preferenced
white voices by emphasizing the voices of immigrants. 12 However, many sources
concerning Chinese immigration are government and newspaper documents, both of
which are primarily filtered through white voices. For the government records,
particularly the Exclusion Case Files, I emphasize Chinese speakers. Other primary
sources used in this thesis include a memoir of a previous tong leader, contemporary
Chinese accounts of Chinatown, articles written by select Chinese residents, interviews
with members of the Portland Chinese community, oral histories, and local and federal
government documents. Together these sources reveal the negotiated presence of Chinese
with Portland, the role of tongs in the community, the events of tong wars, and the ways
in which the Chinese community changed during the twentieth century.
For years, historians have debated the use of newspapers as primary sources in
historical analysis. Like most primary sources, they are fallible. Similar to personal
accounts, newspapers reflect the reporter’s bias and may mischaracterize the facts. 13
However, newspapers both inform and reflect the attitude and worldview of the
community they serve. In this way, newspapers prove to be a powerful source for

12

Gary Okihiro, American History Unbound: Asian and Pacific Islanders (Oakland: University of
California Press, 2015).
13
Joseph Baumgartner, “Newspapers as Historical Sources,” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society
vol. 9, no. 3 (September 1981), 256.
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understanding opinion and views of a particular group.14 Newspaper sources, particularly
the Oregonian, are frequently utilized in this thesis. As a reputable newspaper close to the
events, it is useful in tracing tong wars and the public perception of them. It is not a
vehicle for yellow journalism, but has existed since the early nineteenth century and was
respected for its fair coverage.
At times, a scholar may even leave out the tong wars in discussion of the tongs.15
As such, this work argues that the tong wars showcased the strength of tongs, while also
weakening them. Of those who do address tong wars and a broader description of tongs,
most fail to address the transition of tongs during the twentieth century. Other scholars
leave out the earlier story of tongs when they were at their greatest, or discuss them as
they become mythologized in Chinatown tourism.16 However, it is important to recognize
that the declining influence and changing nature of tongs during the twentieth century
signaled the success of Chinese residents in fighting discrimination, as well as causing
another power vacuum within Chinatown.
The study of race and immigration is central to this thesis. Mae M. Ngai’s work
on immigration reveals as the US government created and passed immigration law, it
created the category of ‘illegal aliens.’ Thus, those previously within the country legally

This method of using newspapers in historical analysis is visible in works such as Robert L. Nelson’s
German Soldier Newspapers of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
15
Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 2nd ed. (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1998) Unlike this work, Marie Rose Wong in Sweet Cakes, Long Journey:
The Chinatowns of Portland, Oregon briefly discusses tong wars, even this thesis’ case study of Portland’s
1917 Tong War.
16
Marie Rose Wong, Sweet Cakes, Long Journey: The Chinatowns of Portland, Oregon (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2004), 203. Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 103.
14
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could now be labeled as illegals, due to new legislation.17 As Ngai showed in her work,
illegal status shapes all aspects of life including work, family life, and gender roles.18 As
Chinese immigrants were not only categorized as ‘non-white’ racially, but also seen as
illegals in the eyes of the public, assimilation within society became more difficult and
they became labeled as permanent outsiders. Historians such as Ronald Takaki have
examined how race, and the impacts of racism on legislation, led to a transition in labor
patterns. This legislation pushed Chinese miners into other forms of work in laundries,
farms, and on the railroads.19 Peggy Pascoe’s work on marriage and miscegenation also
reveals how legislation shaped American opinions on race, gender, along with the
appropriate and inappropriate ways for different races to interact.20 While certain forms
of labor permitted interaction between ethnically Chinese people and whites, marriage,
and even socialization for many, between the two groups were taboo.
Critical Race Theory, specifically as shown in David Roediger’s work on
whiteness, reveals the social constructs of race and the culture of racism.21 The Chinese
Exclusion Act passed in 1882, only seventeen years since the Civil War ended. The
United States was preoccupied with race in the new post slavery world. Ideas on race

17

Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014), xxi.
18
Ibid.
19
Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 2nd ed. (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1998). Another work that discusses transition to different labor options is
Cecilia Tsu, Garden of the World: Asian Immigrants and the Making of Agriculture in California’s Santa
Clara Valley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Another work showing the impact of racism of
legislation for Chinese immigrants is Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the
Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
20
Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
21
David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class, 3rd ed.
(New York: Verso, 2007).
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continued to shape what was possible for racial minorities, and how society viewed them.
Using Roediger’s example and building on the work of Erika Lee, this thesis examines
the impacts of race and how powerful members within Chinatown complicated racial
constructs.
In this thesis, I will use Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism to explore the ways
in which newspapers, government officials, and citizens regarded Chinese immigrants as
inferior to themselves in almost all possible ways.22 This work is also shaped by social
movement theory, as described by Sidney Tarrow, to understand the mobilization and
group efforts of Chinese immigrants in forming protective organizations.23 Furthermore,
as tongs participated in both legal and illegal activities, this work incorporates David
Brotherton’s theory on gangs and how they appeal to marginalized people.24 These
works provide a framework for examination into the broader impacts of race,
immigration, discrimination, and marginalization in shaping communities and
opportunities available immigrants.
Chinese immigrants to the United States actively shaped the communities that
they lived in. Faced with hostile treatment, physical abuse, and unable to find protection
from legal authorities, Chinese men united together to protect one another physically, to
provide economic assistance, and to create social spaces to form relationships. While
frequently stereotyped as simply “Chinese gangs,” these groups proved to be much more.

22

Edward Said, Orientalism, 25th Anniversary Ed. (New York: Random House, 1994).
Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, rev.ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 23-24.
24
David C. Brotherton, Youth Street Gangs: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Routledge, 2015), 57.
23

13

CHAPTER II
A NEED FOR PROTECTION: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHINESE IMMIGRANTS

Beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Chinese arrivals to the
United States faced frequent violence, widespread racism, and discriminative legislation.
Nativism inspired the passage of restrictive laws and codes on the Chinese, which
culminated in the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Anti-Chinese sentiment
bred discontentment among whites that erupted in anti-Chinese riots and massacres
during the late nineteenth century. To alleviate the prejudice facing them, many Chinese
converted to Christianity, adopted western dress, and learned English. However, the
violence and racism continued and the US authorities consistently denied the Chinese
community both protection and assistance. Confronted with these denials, Chinese
immigrants organized themselves into groups to protect themselves and their
communities. They formed groups centered around the need for self-preservation
economically, financially, and physically. Hostility towards the community led to a
dispersal of Chinese immigrants across the United States, as many left areas like San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle for “safer” cities like Portland, and areas further east
in the United States.

The Early Arrivals
Large scale emigration from China to the United States began in the middle of the
nineteenth century. The discovery of Gold in California in 1848 spurred many across the
globe to flock to the western coast in hopes of making their fortune. News of the

14

discovery quickly reached those living in the southern part of China’s Guangdong
province.25 The people of this area suffered from famine; caused by excessive rain,
subsequent flooding, and political unrest. Rebellions and a weakening Qing dynasty
exacerbated the problems in China.26 The economic and political chaos of southern China
encouraged many, chiefly single young men, to make their way to Gum Saan, or the Gold
Mountain, as California came to be known.27 The Gold Rush brought over 300,000
people to California by 1854. The 1852 census for California shows a population of
around 260,000. Chinese immigrants accounted for only 25,000, or 9.62% of the total
population.28
Chinese men travelled to the United States in hopes of finding wealth in the gold
mines, but they often encountered a hostile reception. As the new Chinese arrivals
competed with other American and immigrant men, discrimination and violence towards
the Chinese miners quickly increased. Frequently pushed out of their claims by others,
many Chinese miners often reworked abandoned mines. Using this strategy, Chinese
miners could “avoid confrontations with white miners, but also to make a return on their
labor.”29 They crafted strategies to make a living in a new country, competing
economically with other native and immigrant men.
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Many Chinese miners left California and traveled north with the discovery of gold in
the southern Oregon territory in 1851.30 By 1855, the initial Gold Rush in California died
out. Most Chinese enjoyed only marginal success in the mines, with only a few making
their fortunes. Nevertheless, mining opportunities far outweighed the earning potential
available back home in southern China. As such, hundreds of Chinese men continued to
emigrate from China, bound for the western United States. When they arrived, these men
entered various forms of employment from laboring in mines, to work in shipping,
canning, and railroad construction.
Chinese laborers frequently sent part of their earnings back to China to help
provide and care for family members back home. As it was not proper or economical to
bring their wives and children, Chinese men supported their families across the world by
sending money back. This changed later on as more wives and children joined husband
and fathers in the United States as emigration from China continued into the twentieth
century. Despite the regulations and exclusion, some Chinese merchants successfully
brought their family members into the country. The same could not be said of Chinese
laborers, who lacked social standing, funds, and legitimacy in the eyes of the US
government.

The Change of American Attitudes
Chinese enthusiasm for emigration to the United States lasted beyond the
influence of the Gold Rush. The period between 1870 and 1880 saw Chinese immigrant
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figures increase from 63,199 to 105,465; with over eighty percent living along the West
Coast.31 Curious Americans considered early Chinese immigrants as oddities. Quickly
however, this curiosity turned into derision. Racist attitudes towards the Chinese grew
throughout the century, substantially so during times economic downturns and financial
panics. However, the violent acts towards the Chinese along with restrictive legislation
failed to dissuade Chinese emigration. Rather, many Chinese continued to take the
journey from Southern China to the United States in hopes of a better life.
Business owners viewed the Chinese as a smart investment. From employers’
perspective, they worked hard with little to no complaints, for a lot less money than their
white counterparts. As discussed by a contemporary sociologist, Mary Roberts Coolidge,
in 1909, California businesses, on average, paid Chinese laborers $1.25 a day, compared
to the $2.50 -$4.00 earned by whites for the same labor.32 Chinese workers labored in the
development of cities, the construction of railroads, and assisted the growth of many
businesses across the West. Employers, politicians, and city leaders regarded Chinese
workers as a great resource that could facilitate both company and infrastructure
development, proving a benefit to American cities. Nineteenth century historian Tuthill
wrote that
“The cleanliness, politeness and good behavior of the Chinese was in everybody’s
mouth and what they contributed saved several counties from bankruptcy. Certain of our
manufacturing industries could not without their aid have gained a foothold thus early;
nor could the Central Pacific Railway, an enterprise vital to every interest in the state,
have been pushed forward with the speed it has been; not so much in the latter case, from
31
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their cheapening of labor as in their filling a demand that must otherwise have remained
unfulfilled.”33
Leaders within the city placed emphasis on the idea that Chinese did the labor that no
one else would. This contrasts with the depiction of the Chinese as ‘stealing jobs,’
revealing that the Chinese filled the gaps left by white labor.34 This positive attitude
towards Chinese labor declined over time, and during the late 1860s and 1870s, sentiment
among workers, union leaders, and city officials changed as many felt the Chinese had
worn out their welcome.
By the second half of the 19th century, Chinese foreignness, displayed in their
Buddhist beliefs, Confucian morals, and even their traditional dress seemed to many
Americans as contradictory to American ideals of Christianity, democracy, and freedom.
Popular American culture deemed the Chinese residents as perpetual aliens, both
unwilling and incapable of assimilation and participation in the American nation.
Residents, close to areas of large Chinese populations, noted immigrants’ continued
allegiance to China as a sign of disloyalty to the United States. Citizens also argued that
use of the Chinese language demonstrated an immigrant’s continuing loyalty to China
over the United States, and served as evidence of their refusal to integrate into society.
Critics, including various politicians and labor unions, pointed to how Chinese
immigrants spent their wages, and argued that they threatened the health of the American
economy by sending back home part of their wages to family members in China, instead

33

Mary Roberts Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1909), 343. Here
Coolidge is quoting from Franklin Tuthill, The History of California (San Francisco: H.H. Bancroft &
Company, 1866).
34
Ibid., 344.

18

of spending it on American products and businesses.35 Furthermore, these critics
considered the Chinese as carriers of disease, literally threatening the health and safety of
white communities. As historian Joan B. Trauner shows, both federal and local officials
often used the Chinese as scapegoats to explain the failure of sanitation programs
introduced during the nineteenth century, even though the programs typically had little to
do with the Chinese people.36
Increasingly, American men used the arguments of moral bankruptcy, economic
burdens, and carriers of disease to justify violence towards the Chinese. Additionally, the
argument that Chinese men deprived white men of job opportunities and a fair wage
became a pervasive theme in anti-Chinese rhetoric. Anti-Chinese sentiment spread
rapidly during times of economic downturn as job stability became uncertain. As
recessions, depressions, and panics occurred during the late 1800s, hostility towards the
Chinese festered. The Panic of 1873 and the Long Depression furthered the stereotype of
Chinese workers stealing jobs from honest white laborers and encouraged violence and
legislation against the Chinese, while also petitioning for the government to prevent
further immigration from China.37
Chinese immigrants became the scapegoats for frustrated workers and the
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political targets of various labor unions.38 Organizations such as the Workingmen’s Party
of California, created in 1877, emphasized the threat of Chinese labor to white men, with
chants and slogans, ‘The Chinese must go!’39 Almost a decade later, workers and trade
unions created the American Federation of Labor, with Samuel Gompers as the president.
AFL dialogue surrounding Chinese labor echoed that of the Workingmen’s Party, in
arguing that employment of Chinese workers meant less work for white laborers while
undercutting wages, subsequently forcing white laborers to work for less pay. The
Knights of Labor also pushed a nativist agenda centered on the ills of the Chinese
presence in the United States and the problems they caused for white, American workers.
These groups also reinforced stereotypes of Chinese immigrants as dirty, diseased, and
inferior to the American people.40 The activities and rhetoric of both groups encouraged
riots against the Chinese and asserted the needs for legislative action against them.

Violence Towards the Chinese
Xenophobic behavior expressed through violent treatment and anti-Chinese riots
became common place in areas with large Chinese populations. As a result, many
Chinese residents banded together in organizations for protection. Many Chinese also
migrated to safer areas, like Portland, to escape the abusive treatment they suffered at the
hands of their white neighbors. As more Chinese entered the city, Portland’s Chinatown
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grew and changed.
One of the earliest, large scale events of anti-Chinese violence occurred in Los
Angeles, known as the Chinese Massacre of 1871. The Sacramento Daily Union reported
that on October 21st, a disagreement between Chinese residents led to a shootout between
two men. During the shootout, bullets hit nearby officer Bilderain and a bystander,
Robert Thompson, with the latter later dying from his injury.41 A few days later on the
night of October 24th, the Sacramento Daily Union reports that violence broke out and
“crimes which cause Christianity to weep, civilization to blush, and humanity to mourn”
took place.42 On that night over 500 men gathered in Chinatown, after hearing about the
white casualties from the days before. A rumor also spread of Chinese killing whites in
the city.43 The mob of 500 men entered Chinatown, attacking and slaughtering the
Chinese residents without restraint. During the night of the 24th, the mob tortured and
hung eighteen Chinese men, in a twisted form of vigilante justice. Only ten faced charges
brought against them for their roles in the murder of the men. However, since courtrooms
did not permit Chinese testimony against whites, the judge dismissed most of the cases
due to insufficient evidence.44 The newspapers recorded witness statements that on the
night of October 24th, the police officers did little to help the men targeted by the mob
and that “it does not appear that any attempt whatever was made by any officer to arrest
any of those who, in their presence, were openly and greatly violating the law, even to the
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taking of human life.”45 Despite the inaction of police officials to protect Chinese
residents, coverage of the massacre during the subsequent months consistently implied
that ultimate blame for the carnage lay with the Chinese themselves.
Only six years later, to the north, the San Francisco Riot broke out. On the night
of July 23rd, 1877 after a meeting of the Workingmen’s Party, a mob, composed of 500600 angry white men, descended on Chinatown. Spilling into the morning of the 24th, the
mob destroyed property throughout the Chinese community, including a number of
Chinese laundries and the Chinese Methodist Mission.46 Police, the militia, and
volunteers joined together to put an end to the riot. The following day, Mayor Bryant
denounced the riot and reassured the city that as long as he was mayor, such violence
would not be permitted. He further promised that “any attempt to excite a riot will be
crushed at the commencement.”47 However, over the next few decades, his pledge of
protection proved empty as the violence witnessed in the San Francisco Riot of 1877
indicated only the beginning of such abuses for the Chinese community.
While local leaders in Tacoma condemned the Chinese Massacre of 1871 in Los
Angeles and the mob actions in the San Francisco Riot of 1877, anti-Chinese sentiment
boiled over into violent action in 1885.48 Problems began when a water company decided
to cut costs by hiring Chinese men instead of whites. With high levels of unemployment
among white men, this decision by a local employer further augmented the animosity
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many inhabitants felt towards the immigrant men. Many of these men joined together and
created the Workingmen’s Union. The union’s anti-Chinese foundation upheld political
aims to rid the city of the Chinese. This group grew influential and helped elect R. Jacob
Weisbach, a merchant well known for his dislike of Chinese residents, to office of City
Mayor. These actions, along with the creation of a new branch of the Knights of Labor in
Tacoma, created more opportunities to lash out against the Chinese.49 On February 21st,
the Mayor called a meeting where locals gathered to discuss the Chinese problem and
potential solutions to it. Some of these solutions included segregation and condemning
immigrant stores as violating the health code. At the end of the meeting, the community
decided on a plan of exclusion, centered on pushing the Chinese out from the area
physically and economically starve Chinatown, stating that it was “the duty of every good
citizen to discourage the giving of employment to them.”50
That same evening, Tacoma residents formed a committee to spearhead the efforts
and later ordered the local Chinese to leave permanently by November 1st or else action
would be taken against them.51 Some Chinese residents left willingly, and on November
3rd, a group of 500 men, physically expelled the remaining Chinese. Many travelled on to
Portland, to live and work, after facing such hostility in Tacoma.52 The Daily Astorian
sympathized with the desire of residents to rid themselves of the Chinese problem, stating
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that
“[t]here is a natural desire on the part of a good many on this coast to get rid of
the Chinese. We nearly all want to have them go and stay gone, believing that it is
for the material interests of the country. Anything that can be done to further this
desire is right and proper to do. Anything that tends to keep back the furtherance
of the endeavor is wrong and improper.”
However, the paper continues that while the desire is right, the actions taken
hindered the long-term goal and that the Chinese issue needed to be dealt with
appropriately through appeals to Congress.53
Several months after Tacoma expelled its Chinese residents, followed suit. On
From February 6-9th, white workers joined together and forcefully entered Chinese
homes. Once entered, they forced the Chinese to pack their belongings and leave for the
Queen of the Pacific steamship. In total, the white workers pushed more than 350
Chinese out of Seattle and onto the ship.54 The mid-1880s witnessed a variety of other
riots and massacres directed at the Chinese including the Rock Springs Massacre of 1885
in Wyoming and the Hells Canyon Massacre of 1887 in Oregon. These violent acts
encouraged migration of Chinese to areas perceived as safer, like Portland and cities
further east. The influx of Chinese to Portland changed the dynamics of Chinatown. The
abuse of Chinese immigrants by white citizens drove many to join protective
associations.
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Legislative Restrictions Against the Chinese
Along with physical violence, the Chinese immigrants experienced legislative
prejudice. Many nativist groups sought to eliminate Chinese communities throughout the
States, mainly in the West. Formal and informal restrictions limited where the Chinese
could live, the sort of labor they could perform, why they could marry, the ability to
testify in court, and even included the denial of rights to native born Chinese
Americans.55
The earliest legal restraints on the Chinese took form in local and state legislation.
In 1850, the state of California passed the “Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and
the government of Foreign Miners.”56This act meant that all non-native miners in
California needed a license in order to work in the mines. This license included a date of
issue, the citizenship of the person, age, and “complexion.” The license cost $20 and
required renewal every thirty days. The Collector of Licenses collected the names of
anyone who refused to comply or neglected to renew their license and turned them over
to the Sheriff whose “duty it shall be to summon a posse of American citizens, and, if
necessary, forcibly prevent him or them from continuing such mining operations.”57
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Commonly referred to as the Foreign Miner’s Tax, this piece of legislation proved
significant in two ways. The first is the appeal of the tax to other miners seeking to lessen
the competition. At $20, the license was very expensive and discouraged many from
continuing their efforts in the gold mines. Secondly, this tax became an additional source
of revenue for the state. As such, this law encouraged Chinese miners to leave the
goldfields, and provided additional tax revenue to the state.58 However, the tax failed its
secondary role. The California legislature repealed the act the next year in 1851, on the
grounds that it financially hurt the state.59 A new license tax for foreign miners became
state law in 1852. Rather than the previous $20 per month, the new license called for a
fee of $3.60
Many states also passed anti-miscegenation laws, criminalizing marriage between
whites and the Chinese. In Oregon, the first piece of anti-miscegenation legislation
passed in 1862. In 1866, the state legislature further clarified and limited intermarriage in
the “Act to Prohibit the Intermarriage of Races.” This act outlawed marriages between
white persons and African Americans, whites and Chinese, and whites and Native
Americans. Those found to be breaking this law were subject to imprisonment from three
months to one year in jail.61 Oregon’s proscription on ‘unsuitable’ marriages occurred

58

For additional information regarding the role of anti-Chinese legislation in the early days of California,
with a focus on taxation, see Mark Kanazawa’s “Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: Anti-Chinese
Legislation in Gold Rush California,” The Journal of Economic History 65, no. 3 (Sept., 2005), 781.
59
“Repeal of the Foreign Miners’ Tax Law,” Daily Alta California, March 20, 1851.
60
The state raised this fee over the next couple decades. “An Act To provide for the protection of
Foreigners, and to define their liabilities and privileges,” Chapter 37 of the Statutes of California, Passed at
the Third Session of the Legislature (San Francisco: G.K. Fitch & Co. and V.R. Geiger & Co., State
Printers, 1852), California State Library, Law Department, 84-85.
61
“Act to Prohibit the Intermarriage of Races, 1866,” Oregonian, November 2, 1866, The Oregon History
Project of the Oregon Historical Society.

26

within a wider framework of restricting interracial marriage. Peggy Pascoe points out that
“although such marriages were infrequent throughout most of U.S. history, an enormous
amount of time and energy was nonetheless spent in trying to prevent them from taking
place.”62
Cities also restricted Chinese labor. In Portland, the city required a license for all
Chinese laundries. In April of 1885, eleven Chinese launders wrote a letter to the city
requesting that the license fees be reduced to $5.63 Portland also banned Chinese men
from working on city projects and construction. Any work the city outsourced included a
clause in the contract that the “undersigned promises and agrees not to employ any
Chinese labor on the work.”64 Such agreements show the appeal and centrality of Chinese
labor for Portland businessmen and concerted effort of local workers to push Chinese
laborers out of the wider job market.
Anti-Chinese sentiment, evidenced in both local and state ordinances, culminated in
the creation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.65 This act built upon previous
restrictions found in the 1875 Page Act which prohibited the immigration of Chinese
women. The passage of the Exclusion Act placed severe restrictions on Chinese
immigration for a period of ten years. After the initial ten years passed, Congress
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renewed the Exclusion Act for an additional ten, and further broadened its restrictions. In
1902 Congress made Chinese Exclusion permanent.
The Exclusion Act banned Chinese laborers, both skilled and unskilled, from
entering the United States. The government continued to permit students, doctors, and
merchants, entry into the United States. 66 As a nation, the United States prided itself on
its immigrant heritage, yet it saw non-white immigrants as dangerous, who needed to be
regulated.67 While racist attitudes existed towards other immigrant communities, like
Eastern Europeans and the Irish, Congress only codified the contempt towards Chinese
immigrants into national law to stop entry into the United States. Unlike other immigrant
groups, American society epitomized the Chinese as those unwilling and incapable of
assimilation. White Americans perceived even children of Chinese ancestry, born and
raised in the United States, as permanent outsiders. While denying Chinese immigrants
the opportunity to integrate into society, American citizens and legislation of the United
States also criticized those immigrants for wanting to return to China. This placed
Chinese residents in limbo and made it impossible for the Chinese to avoid
discrimination and racist violence.
The Chinese Exclusion Act was the first piece of national immigration legislation
that excluded people based solely on nationality. The Chinese Exclusion Act revealed the
changing feelings towards immigration in the United States, as many blamed immigrants
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for stealing jobs, especially during economic downturns. The act also shows how racism
impacted immigration legislation. The Statistical Abstract of the United States from 1882
reports that over three million immigrants entered from Europe from 1872 to 1882; with
roughly one million coming from the British Isles and another million from Germany.
For the same period, the record shows 168,213 immigrants entering from all Asian
countries combined.68 Also, during the nineteenth century, many Irish immigrants entered
the United States, seeking relief from the Great Famine. Many American workers bristled
under the increasing Irish population, but Congress did not enact legislative restrictions
against Irish immigration. While Asian immigration had not even reached 200,000, the
United States saw the Chinese as a threat serious enough for comprehensive, national
legislation restricting their immigration.
Workers and government officials alike hoped the passage of the Chinese Exclusion
Act would discourage emigrating Chinese citizens from traveling to the United States.
One purpose of the law involved policing national borders to prevent unwanted Chinese
laborers from crossing. While the wording of the act made it comprehensive in scope, the
government’s ability to enforce the law quickly became challenging as both interpretation
of the act and insufficient funding problematized its execution.69 Enforcement of the
Exclusion Act originally fell to the responsibility of the Customs Service, a part of the
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Treasury Department. Customs officials at ports interpreted the law in various ways. 70
Ultimately how ports interpreted and imposed the act differed not only from place to
place, but also between officials.

Circumventing Exclusion
The size of most Chinese communities across the West decreased as a result of
the Exclusion Act. However, Portland’s Chinatown experienced growth during the
Exclusion Era.71 Chinese immigrants traveling to Portland from other areas along with
the system of illegal immigration created after the passage of the Exclusion Act created
this influx. For the Chinese, the Exclusion Act did not mean the end to immigration. It
did however make a previously long process that much more difficult; as well as raising
the price tag attached to the already expensive journey.
Under the Exclusion Act, documentation became central for Chinese migration to
and from the United States. A Chinese laborer entering the United States typically needed
to purchase forms showing false family relations, creating new identities. They purchased
false documents of “fictive kin,” claiming to be family members of a legally permitted
Chinese immigrant. These people became known as “paper sons and daughters,”
documents rather than blood created these relations.
Not all Chinese people pursued this avenue. A key component of the Exclusion
Act allowed merchants, doctors, and students to immigrate. As such, laborers regularly
claimed membership in a higher social class; often posing as merchants. Places existed in
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China where those preparing to emigrate could borrow clothing and pose for photographs
to authenticate their claims to a specific social status. With this, customs officials began
to focus on the physical body, as part of the interview process, looking for signs of labor
in calloused hands and weathered skin. The Department of Commerce and Labor issued
certificates for registered Chinese laborers as they journeyed to China. It was necessary to
present a verified certificate upon returning to the United States. The form included the
statement declaring oneself to be a Chinese laborer. A few lines below included a section
for physical marks and “peculiarities for identification.” Here, along with a photograph,
officials wrote down weight, height, eye color, complexion, and any other physical
identifiers like scars, abnormalities, etc.72
Physical identifiers became cues as to the status of incoming Chinese. As in the
questioning of the merchant Ngan Lim, customs officials questioned men as to whether
or not their wife’s feet were “natural or bound.”73 Inspectors frequently decided the
legitimacy of family claims based on whether or not the applicant and the professed
relation shared enough similar facial features. An example of this is Low Ying Ho and
Low Heen, “alleged merchant and member of the Chew Chong Company,” stating that
“There seems to be a strong family resemblance between Low Heen and the photograph
of the applicant.”74 With this simple judgement call of one individual, the customs
official granted Low Ying Ho entry into the United States.
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Regardless of the avenue chosen, documents known as coaching letters became an
essential part of successful entry. Upon arrival to the United States, Chinese immigrants
often found themselves interviewed by a custom official. These letters provided answers
to questions asked during the interrogation. These questions varied and could include
easy questions like ‘who is your brother?’ and more detailed questions like asking the
exact route an acquaintance took when they travelled to China.75 Questions such as the
latter could even confuse ‘legitimate’ immigrants into answering incorrectly. As such,
coaching letters became widely used during the Exclusion Era. Hidden in peanut shells,
orange peels, and baked goods, these documents made their way to immigrants in
detainment.76
Interviews by customs officials involved multiple players. Whether a first-time
arrival in the United States or applying for reentry, immigration officials questioned, and
frequently re-questioned Chinese residents along with family members and business
associates. Interviewers commonly asked immigrants about their family relationships,
along with where their family members lived, their ages, what part of China they came
from, and more. For example, when Long Chong sought entry into the United States, he
along with friends and family became subject to multiple interviews and a myriad of
questions. During Chong’s entry process, immigration official Albert Long interviewed
Chong’s acquaintance, Gow Why. Albert Long asked Gow Why numerous questions
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about Chong, Long Chong’s father, the village he lived in, the mother’s name, where his
parents died, the kind of feet his mother had, and more.77 These interviews routinely
included questions that necessitated more information than most people knew about one
another. As such, it reveals the difficulty of the interview process and why many Chinese,
whether of the permitted class or not, often used coaching letters or devices to assist them
in interviews.
Providing statements from white witnesses proved particularly important for
Chinese, especially those applying for reentry to the United States. Henry Roberts and
Nathan Wise gave statements for Low’s application to reenter the United States after his
visit to China. These men knew Low Chew from business and provided testimony as to
whether or not Low Chew performed any manual labor within the last year.78 These
statements reveal the problems that many Chinese faced in the United States. The two
racial groups interacted infrequently and only in specific situations. Yet, the legal
existence of many Chinese residents, at this time, depended on the testimony of a white
citizen.
The interpreter also played a key role in the interviews done by customs officials.
The interpreter held significant power during an interview as historian Mae M Ngai
articulates, “how the interpreter used that power – and one could not always be sure –
could either assist or thwart the immigrants’ chances for entry into the country, for
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justice, for survival.”79 Because of this, the interpreters played an important role in the
immigration process and even in relations between the Chinese community and
government. Parents and spouses also influenced interviews by custom officials. The
Exclusion Act Case Files include notes from officials recording their suspicions of family
members, often parents, for coaching their children and relatives during the interview
process.
On July 23,1908, Chun Geow sat across from Immigration Official John B.
Sawyer. Accompanied by her mother, Geow answered question after question posed by
Sawyer concerning her brother Chun Woy, who recently returned to Portland after a trip
to China. At times, Geow misunderstood Sawyer’s questions and so her mother clarified
what the official asked in Chinese. Believing the mother to be coaching Geow, Sawyer
told the mother to be silent. Sawyer recorded the following, ‘Note: Mother continually
coaches the witness. Mother is cautioned to keep quiet. She states her daughter does not
understand.’80 While it is possible that the mother coached her daughter during this line
of inquiry, it is also plausible that Chun Geow genuinely became confused during the
interview and her mother tried to help her understand the questions being asked.
Chinese immigrants often evaded immigration officials, but they needed a
network of people in the United States and China to carry out their plans successfully.
The case, Yip Fong vs the United States, illustrates such a network. In October of 1909,
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the Multnomah District Court brought charges against Yip Fong, alias Chong Fook, along
with Chow Bot, for violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, stating that both men
did “knowingly, willfully and unlawfully aid and abet the landing in the United States of
America at Portland, Oregon, from a foreign vessel to-wit, the steamship “Henrik Ibeen,”
of a Chinese laborer to-wit, Go Wing Zee….” The county further charged Yip Fong and
Chow Bot with also assisting Lum You, alias Lum Lop Ly, an alleged Chinese laborer,
into the United States via the steamship Henrik Ibeen.81 As both Go Wing Zee and Lum
You came from China with no previous residency in the United States and appeared to be
laborers, the District Court found them violating the Chinese Exclusion Act and denied
them entry into the country.
Further investigation revealed letters between the men and Tom Hin, a Hong
Kong merchant, discussing their plans to bring three to five more men into the country on
another trip. The letter also advised Tom Hin that they secured a second safe location
available “if the boatswain should say too much.”82 Officials also discovered a Chinese
bill of contract between Tom Hin and partners Jow Bot and Yip Fong, for smuggling
Chinese laborers into the United States. According to the bill, the price for each laborer
totaled $450, $60 of which had been paid before leaving Hong Kong. Payment was
conditional upon successful entry. Tom Hin would pay Jow Bot and Yip Fong only if the
immigrants safely entered the United States. He warned, “if the said goods are unable to
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land and are returned to Hong Kong…then this money will not be delivered and this bill
will be invalid.”83 Newspapers reported that the vessel did contain five immigrants, but
the police only detained two. Apparently, the remaining three were successfully
smuggled into the country.84
Chow worked on the Norwegian ship as a carpenter, and according to Yip Fong’s
confession and a statement made by District Attorney Evans, Chow was “an old offender
against the immigration laws of the United States.”85 Supposedly, Chow previously
smuggled between twenty-five to thirty men into the country on the steamship
Minnesota, which landed at Seattle. For Chow, the business was worth the risk; each
Chinese man brought into the country successfully earned him $350. Sometimes bribes
cut into his profits. During an earlier trip aboard the Henrik Ibsen, an officer approached
Chow Bot and threatened to expose him. However, Chow supposedly paid the officer off
and was allowed to continue.86
Even with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese immigrants found
ways to circumvent exclusion. But their struggle with the law would not stop there. Upon
arrival, they still encountered hostility, resentment, and violence from white
communities. Even so, Chinese immigrants found ways to cope in the new country.
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Navigating Discrimination
Discrimination and violence haunted the lives of Chinese residents in the United
States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Chinese adapted to mitigate the
racism shaping their lives. They converted to Christianity, learned English, as well
adopting western styles of grooming and dress. However, most of these required, in at
least some form, a rejection of traditional Chinese culture. In contrast, joining and
participating in protective Chinese group was the most effective method in confronting
and combating the racism directed at the Chinese immigrants.
If a Chinese resident left Buddhism and converted to a Christian faith, they
typically found a circle within the larger white community that offered a degree of social
acceptance and, at times, temporal assistance. As evidenced in the story of Ah Ho, a
female Chinese immigrant in the late nineteenth century who the Presbyterian Christian
mission in Portland identifies as a “solid Christian,” describes the need to not “lead her
own heart into temptation” nor tempt “some weak brother or sister of her own race” by
keeping any mementos of her old Chinese faith.87 Born to a Cantonese family, Ah Ho and
her mother entered a Christian mission at a young age. Soon after entering, her mother
fell ill and returned to family, leaving Ah Ho alone in the mission, left in the care of a
Mrs. Happer. After a couple years, the mission returned Ah Ho to her family. However,
soon after trouble arose in her home region and soldiers carried Ah Ho off with other
young girls. After changing hands numerous times, Mrs. Happer found Ah Ho for sale in
the street. Mrs. Happer purchased her and brought her back to the mission. Tricked by a
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woman working in the mission Ah Ho fled and found herself enslaved. With promises of
a reunion with Mrs. Happer in America, described as a “Golden Hill, where everybody
sat upon chairs of solid gold,” Ah Ho left China and headed for California. Ah Ho never
shared much detail about her early days in San Francisco, except that the promises of
freedom and reunion made to her were false. Sick and dying, Ah Ho ended up at the
Presbyterian mission. There she recovered and found a new home with a Christian
Chinese couple until she married. Ah Ho busied herself in the mission the rest of her
days, proselytizing to fellow Chinese immigrants in San Francisco. From her arrival in
the United States until her death, Ah Ho strived to exemplify a good Christian and
American life. She proudly showed off her American home surrounded by American
neighbors, whom she frequently visited, and spoke English.88 The story of Ah Ho
describes ways in which immigrants could find a degree of acceptance in the United
States through adopting Christianity. While promoting Christian conversion, Ah Ho’s
story simultaneously endorses a trade of Chinese culture, community, and language for
the American versions, placing greater value on American qualities than Chinese ones.
Some Chinese adapted by altering dress and grooming habits. Chinese men cut
their traditional queues and adopted short hairstyles to demonstrate their willingness to
“westernize.” These grooming changes often accompanied the adoption of the western
style of dress, exchanging loose Chinese clothing for suits and ties. Photographs of the
members of the Chinese-American Citizens Alliance from 1921 show this transition in
choice of clothing and appearance, as the majority of men, both young and old, are
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dressed in suits with short hair, parted on the side.89 Leong Gor Yun described how
central American standards became for Chinese gentlemen, stating, “Once you have
become a gentleman, you can enjoy a life of leisure, smoke the most expensive cigars,
give lavish banquets, and wear the finest tailor-cut suits – not to forget a derby hat. You
must also carry a copy of The New York Times when you are out; whether you look at it
upside-down does not matter much. In short, you must put up a front regardless of
cost.”90 Here Yun reveals how adopting western culture, or at least appearing to have
adopted western culture, became a signifier of masculinity and honor for Chinese
immigrant men. For example, this passage shows that Chinese men did not necessarily
need to know what the newspaper discussed, or even be able to read English, carrying
The New York Times was enough.
Learning English became an invaluable skill for those Chinese residents who
wanted to participate in the wider community. This allowed figures like Seid Back to
become middlemen in dealings between Chinatown and the larger city of Portland.
Reverend William Speer held the first English class for Chinese immigrants in 1853. He
noted that even then most of the students were young men, mostly merchants or the sons
of merchants, wanting to learn to help in business.91 They desired their non-Chinese
neighbors to see them as contributing to the larger society, particularly since most
Americans believed the Chinese hurt the economy by sending money back to China,
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rather than spending it on American goods. As such, many merchants, and other wealthy
Chinese men, financially invested in the community, in part to combat white distrust of
Chinese immigrants. An example of this is from the earlier days of Chinese immigration.
In 1856, San Francisco saw a rise in “lawlessness” among the white population. Leading
men in the community revived the Vigilance Committee to control and protect the region.
Several Chinese merchants helped fund the committee and “received a vote of thanks”
for their efforts.92

Group Organization
But Chinese efforts to adapt to a new society proved insufficient to address the
widescale discrimination and racism they faced in the United States. Chinese immigrant
men creating organizations centered on providing protection, economically, physically,
and financially, proved the most effective. Standing together and supporting one another
proved the most successful in combating the prejudices they encountered. Building upon
group organizations that originated in China, Chinese immigrant men in the United States
quickly organized themselves into associations. These groups helped to combat the
violence and racism directed at them, as well as the social ostracization in a new country.
Organized along different lines, these groups frequently clashed throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The violence of massacres and riots endangered the Chinese immigrants. The
legislative discrimination and inaction of government left them vulnerable to such
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attacks. Unable to access protection from the state or acceptance within the larger
communities, Chinese residents turned to their ethnic organizations to fill these needs.
Groups known as the tongs focused on economic gain and physical protection. Promises
of money and safety convinced many Chinse residents to join, which in turn empowered
tongs within Chinatown. With increased responsibility and authority, these groups
negotiated power and control of Chinatown with the local government.
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CHAPTER III
FIGHTING FOR CONTROL OF CHINATOWN
Shots rang out late on the night of February 8th where Fourth and Everett street
meet in Portland. Arguments over a supposed three-dollar debt quickly escalated into a
physical confrontation between two groups of men, all members of rival tongs. Shortly
after 10 p.m., the men exchanged roughly twenty-five shots. By the end, one man had
been killed with another two injured. M. Len died a half a block away, in front of the
Kwong Yuen Lung Company, on Fourth street, after being shot in the chest during the
fight. Another bullet hit a bystander, a Japanese man by the name of T. Hokira, who
arrived in Portland only days before. Hitting his collarbone, the gunshot wound
necessitated a visit to the hospital for care. The last of the injuries belonged to an
unidentified Chinese man, who had been shot in the leg.93 The events of February 8th
marked the beginning of what became known as the 1917 Tong War, one of the bloodiest
conflicts of Chinatown in years.
Tongs arose during the nineteenth century, in response to racism, to defend
members against discrimination, violence, and governmental neglect. This negligence,
coupled with the federal policy of the Chinese Exclusion Act, created a power vacuum
within the Chinese community that empowered tongs and led to the tong wars. The 1917
Tong War in Portland demonstrates how exclusion enabled tongs to gain power and
authority in Chinatown, the impact of tong conflict within Chinatown, and the power
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struggle between the tongs and local government in controlling the Chinese community
in Portland.

Chinese Organizations and Tongs
Quickly after the immigrants arrived in the United States in the 1850s, they
developed a variety of organizations designed to protect their interests. Each organization
played important roles for its members. Historians categorize these groups in different
ways. Some only distinguish three main groups – the district associations, family
associations, and tongs.94 Others classify the groups into tongs (堂), fongs (family
associations), and district associations (huiguan 會館).95 Different bodies included family
clans, district associations, labor groups, political associations, tongs, and peace societies.
These groups helped recent arrivals transition to a new country, kept records, provided
financial assistance, aided burial needs, and provided social networks. Widespread
discrimination, violence, difficulty in immigration, and marginalization by government
fostered the formation of these groups.
The organization known as the tong differed from others in that they participated
both in legal and illegal activities. Tongs functioned as classic fraternal orders and
associations that protected their members’ political rights, financial stability and physical
safety. They also trafficked in opium, managed brothels, and operated gambling rooms.
This dualistic nature of tongs allowed for them to successfully combat the US
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government’s efforts to control the Chinese community.
The need for such groups is revealed in a petition Chinese leader sent to the
Mayor and city council of Portland in 1890. Sickness ran rampant through Portland’s
Chinatown. Lacking access to a hospital, Chinese residents, including merchants Young
Hay, Lam Pam, Ah Dimm, Ching Sing, and Woo Sue, petitioned the mayor and city
council about the matter. These community leaders took it upon themselves to rent out
rooms in a building on Second Street and fitted them to be a makeshift hospital “for their
sick and disabled countrymen while sojourning in Portland and to provide them with
proper treatment and means of attention.”96 The petitioners asked the city government to
merely erect a flagpole in front of the building so residents could raise a flag with the
initials of the hospital, the Bo Long Kong Sue Company, to help people find the
building.97 Constructing a makeshift hospital in Chinatown demonstrates the racial
segregation the Chinese communities faced in Portland. The Chinese residents built their
own hospital to gain access to Portland. The council forwarded the appeal to the
Committee on Streets, who recommended to the City Council that the request be granted.
Racial segregation explains how Chinatown relations with larger local government often
resembled agreements or discussions between two governing bodies. Powerful groups,
often headed by wealthy merchants, acted as emissaries representing Chinese will and
needs to local, state, and even federal government agencies.
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Government Failures and Filling Community Needs
Local and federal government officials failed to provide for the Chinese
community’s necessities, neglected to protect them from discrimination and violence, and
undermined their civil rights. In response, Chinese immigrants formed their own quasipolitical or governmental bodies to oversee the communities’ needs and functions. As
sociologists John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald argue, resource mobilization describes
how people coming together and forming groups allows them to better access resources,
attaining the goals and meeting the needs of the members.98 Resource mobilization
explains how the inability or refusal of the United States government, on all levels, to
provide for and assist Chinese immigrants in assimilating, allows for the creation of tongs
to lead and guide new immigrants in shaping their lives.99 Since the Chinese residents
lacked safety, assistance, and security in jobs, groups in Chinatowns organized to address
these needs. The government ensured the existence and success of the tongs by leaving a
power vacuum that leaders in the community filled through extra-governmental
functions.
The earliest organizations were either clan or district associations, but the Chinese
Six Companies, known also as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association
(CCBA), proved the most well-known and perhaps the most influential. According to
their official history, several district associations joined together in San Francisco to form
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the Chinese Six Companies in the mid-nineteenth century and gave the new organization
authority “to speak and act for the Chinese in the western continental United States in all
matters pertaining to their general welfare, whether political, social, or civic”.100 The
district associations that joined together to create the Six Companies included the Sam
Yap, Sz Yap (Kong Chan), Yeung Wo, Hip Kat, Ning Yeung, and Hop Wo.101 The
booklet about the Chinese Six Companies illustrates the ways in which Chinese
immigrant organizations developed in the power vacuum left by the United States
government.
Such organizations became central to the management of Chinatowns. They
oversaw the return of bodies to China for burial. They helped new arrivals find jobs and
they mediated disagreements between Chinese residents. Some groups, principally the
Chinese Six Companies acted as the voice of Chinese residents in the United States in
dealing with local, state, and the federal government. Many organizations, including the
Six Companies, hired their own lawyers to fight arrests, detainment, and other judicial
problems that arose in Chinese communities.

Tong Roots
Scholars disagree about the origins of the tongs and if the organizations are a
phenomenon unique to the United States or if they grew out of groups native to China.
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Eng Gong, a former member of the Hip Sing tong in the twentieth century claims that
tongs grew out of discontentment that many immigrants in California felt towards the Six
Companies and the expansive role they played. He remembers that many immigrants
chafed under its leadership and viewed the association as favoring the larger and socially
prominent families over the rest of the immigrants, notably in settling disputes among
Chinese residents through the Six Companies Tribunal. Frustrated with the Tribunal and
unsuccessful in American courts, a group of men, led by a merchant named Mock Wah
formed the Kwong Dock Tong. Recognized as the earliest tong in the United States, the
Kwong Dock Tong originally began as a Chinese Vigilance Committee designed to
protect its members and obtain justice, even resorting to violence if necessary.102
Subsequently, over fifteen other tongs developed including the Bing Kong Bow Leong,
the Hop Sing, Suey Sing, and Hip Sing tongs.103 As tongs developed, they spread out
from San Francisco across the West Coast and some even made their way east through
new branches of the tongs.
However, historian Ronald Takaki argues that tongs did not begin in the
American West, but rather that the Kwong Dock Tong originated in Guangdong, China
as an “underground anti-government movement.”104 Other historians more explicitly
trace the tongs back earlier, arguing tongs were an outgrowth of the Triad Society that
attempted to overthrow the Ming Dynasty in the seventeenth century.105 Dreams of the

102

Eng Gong and Bruce Grant, Tong War! (New York: Nicholas L. Brown, 1930), 27-28.
Ibid., 5.
104
Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shor: A History of Asian Americans, rev.ed. (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1998), 235. Takaki spells the name of the tong differently, spelling it as the
Kwang-tek-tong. But he does agree that they first appeared in California in 1852.
105
Sucheng Chan argues that the tongs, particularly the Chee Kung Tong (Zhigongtang) started as an
offshoot of the Triads and that many left China after the failure of the Taiping Rebellion around the mid103

47

West, a joint project involving Portland State University, Ooligan Press, and the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association explicitly states that the tong did not begin in
China, but formed in San Francisco. It further clarifies the tong as a “form of the secret
societies on the West Coast…” A sociologist in the 1930’s, named C.N. Reynolds, also
found that the Chinese residents he spoke to always stated that tongs are only found in
America, with “no precedent for it in China.”106 While secret societies existed in China,
within contemporary newspaper and oral accounts, discussion of tong activity, are almost
exclusively in relation to the United States, primarily in regards to the western states and
the region around New York. Conflating tong existence with any secret society in China
oversimplifies the existence of these type of groups and ignores the different natures of
these groups. Tongs specifically developed in response to discrimination and civil
neglect, as well as a marginalization by the Chinese Six Companies. The United States
government treated Chinese immigrants as second-class people, consistently the denying
rights and ignoring needs of the Chinese residents. The Chinese Six Companies favored a
select few families over the rest of entrants, who grew to dominate Chinatowns across the
West. Denial by government leaders and favoritism by the Six Companies inspired many
Chinese men to look elsewhere.
Tongs are difficult to define. As complicated organizations, they operated in
legal and illegal spheres in the community. The Chinese term for tong is 堂 and it
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translates to ‘hall.’ On one level, the tong existed as a fraternal men’s club. On another
level, newspapers, citizens, and even government officials viewed the tongs as nothing
more than Chinese gangs involved in illicit activities. Scholars and the popular press
emphasized the somewhat secretive nature of tongs with their “secret initiation rites and
sworn brotherhood.”107 However, such a limited description ignores the complex role
tongs played in the community. Historically, many gangs have included poor members
of marginalized groups, and come together to form a ‘resistant identity.’108 Tongs
similarly brought together marginalized people, Chinese residents across various social
classes. Through the tongs, men formed new group identities that provide them strength,
protection, and success. Even though most tongs participated in illegal dealings such as
prostitution, opium, and gambling, they also participated in charitable projects for the
community.

Incentives to Join
Membership in most Chinese organizations reflected family relations and the
region of China they came from. Distinct from other Chinese associations, the tongs did
not restrict membership to only Chinese immigrants and their American born
descendants. Nor did they restrict membership to family networks, or even social
standing. Regardless of ethnicity, wealth, social status, or family ties, Chinese tongs
allowed any willing man the opportunity to join. Tongs united rich merchants and poor
laborers in a new bond of brotherhood. Both old men and young worked together. While
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available to white men or other immigrant males, most tong members were either
Chinese immigrants or those of Chinese heritage.109 As tongs accepted any interested
man to join their ranks, tong membership grew rapidly.110 As tong numbers grew so did
their influence on the community. The tongs gained power due to the marginalized space
of Chinese immigrants who found the elitism of the Chinese Six Companies unbearable,
the family and district associations as unable to meet all their needs, and the US
government’s mistreatment of Chinese residents. However, the actions of the tongs often
precluded a wider acceptance of the groups and reinforced their marginalization.
Tongs filled a need for relationships among Chinese residents. Discriminatory
legislation issued by the local and federal government made it difficult or impossible for
many Chinese men to bring over families. The Chinese Exclusion Act made it difficult
for immigrants to travel back and forth between the United States and China, even to visit
families. The social stigma and legislative prohibition on intermarriage heightened the
problems faced by Chinese residents, as the gender ratio of most Chinatowns reflected an
overabundance of men with a shortage of women.111 In 1890, records show roughly 9,540
Chinese living in Oregon. Of that, men made up approximately 95% of the population.112
Suffused with single men, the Chinatowns across the United States lacked nuclear
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families.113 Within the tongs, men found opportunities for proxy families ties and close
relationships. These relations assisted in transitioning to life after arrival in the United
States. The fraternal nature of the tongs offered a sense of family to those men separated
from their own. It provided a method of forming new ties; ensuring a place within a
community.
Tongs fulfilled a wide scope of services for their members. They safeguarded
Chinese immigrant tradition and culture. These organizations provided loan programs,
political assistance and maintained Buddhist religious shrines in their headquarters.114
Tong affiliation also provided self-protection from government and other tongs. As
government curtailed the personal rights of Chinese residents and the police did little to
defend them, protection developed into a central feature and goal of tongs across the
United States. Nevertheless, tongs could be ruthless against those who crossed them. “An
eye for an eye” mentality permeated the various tong societies. Peace negotiations began,
and tong wars ended, only after both sides saw the body count as equal and each felt they
could declare themselves the winners.115

Tongs and Chinese Masculinity
Tongs also created an avenue for Chinese men to reclaim gender norms and assert
traditional forms of masculinity. Early Chinese immigrants to the United States originally
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hoped to make their fortune in gold mining. However, after non-Chinese miners
tormented them and state lawmakers passed racist legislation that restricted their access
to mining, Chinese men found job conventionally seen as feminine. Many immigrants
began to work as cooks preparing meals or in laundries, washing clothes.116 In late
nineteenth century Oregon, Chinese men worked in over thirty different occupations.
However, the vast majority toiled as common laborers, laundry workers, domestics,
cooks, and dishwashers; jobs seen typically as forms of female labor.117 Newspaper
comparisons to the typical female body, further emphasized the physical differences
between Chinese men and American men, that Chinese men tended to be shorter and
slimmer. The feminization of Chinese men played a part in the larger orientalist
perspective of China and Asian countries. For society in the United States, Chinese
immigrants stood in contrast to traditional ideas of American strength, emphasizing
American masculinity, by asserting Chinese inferiority. As Edward Said argues about the
West viewing the East in derogatory terms, the United States characterized China, and
those emigrating from it, as weak and backwards.118 Feminized through their labor and in
commentary concerning their physical appearance, tongs provided a space for Chinese
men to reclaim their masculinity.
The Chinese principle of ‘face’ incentivized men to join tongs. Similar to honor,
which is often associated with conceptions of masculinity and who is able to successfully
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make claim to masculinity, “face” guaranteed a man’s standing and prestige in the
community.119 Having “more” face yielded greater individual respect which then
extended to his association in the community.120 As such, especially the physical
struggles between tongs allowed for the role of face, as an idea of honor, to play a central
role in continuing conflict between tongs at war.
One specific way that honor shaped a tong war is in the way that men used
women as a justification for conflict. Newspapers and tong members alike agreed that
women represented a cause for friction between tongs.121 Several accounts of tong wars
place the cause at a rivalry between two men over a sing-song girl with whom they fell in
love.122 As most disagreements between tongs developed out of control over illicit trades,
it is unlikely that the central reason behind a tong war lay with a woman, whether she was
a prostitute, girlfriend, or family member. However, it is significant that tong members
used this kind of language in justifying their actions. By placing the foundation reason for
war with a woman, rather than drugs or gambling, the tongs again make claim to a sense
of honor and reaffirm their masculinity. This version of masculinity and tongs is
portrayed in The War of the Tongs, a silent film released in February 1917, the same time
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that fighting erupted again in Portland.123
The physical dress of tong fighters also reasserted Chinese masculinity. At a time
when many Chinese immigrants and their American born children turned to western style
of dress, these men stood out for their use of traditional dress and wearing the long
queue.124Newspapers provided illustrations of highbinders, emphasizing the traditional
dress, and frequently depicting them as holding a weapon, whether it be a knife or a
gun.125 The newspapers representations helped to reinforce a stereotype of not only tong
members, but of Chinese people as whole, that further instilled ill feelings toward the
immigrant community. This is similar to newspaper portrayal and American attitudes of
Chinese women as all prostitutes during the late nineteenth century and into the
twentieth.126 As Marie Rose Wong points out, the Immigration Service argued that “the
wife of yesterday was considered the prostitute of tomorrow.”127 These stereotypes, and
pictures of them, further heightened anti-Chinese sentiment and anti-Chinese leagues
frequently used them. As American views held all Chinese women to be of disrepute,
tong members came to be associated with only the worst parts of the groups.
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Exclusionary Violence and Tong Assistance
As tongs developed and sought spheres of influence and control over areas of
Chinese communities the organizations grew more violent and committed to illicit
activities. Tongs operated in illicit businesses including opium running, prostitution, and
gambling.128 As tongs grew, they frequently clashed with one another. Conflict in one
city could quickly spread to other branches of tongs and lead to hostilities and violence in
Chinatowns across the Pacific Northwest.
The business of vice played a central role in the operations of tongs. Smuggling of
opium, slave girls destined for brothels, and Chinese workers into the United States
proved risky, but lucrative investments.129 The Exclusion Act ensured the continuation of
groups like the tongs because of their participation in illegal immigration, which
remained as a great and continuing importance to the Chinese community. Rather than
safeguarding American boundaries, the act increased borderland crime as laborers
seeking entrance to America during the Exclusion Era paid tongs for entrance into the
states.130 The Washington Herald in 1915 reported that numerous laborers testified to
paying anywhere between $50 to $200 to the Bing Kong tong to help them into the
United States. After arrival, tongs forced the laborers to continue paying them over ninety
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percent of their earnings or risk the tong exposing them and facing deportation.131 In this
way, the Exclusion Act increased unlawful activities and facilitated third-party groups to
benefit financially from it.
But such extortion did not always protect them. In fact, tong members
experienced significant backlash from their own communities, as many residents,
merchants, and businessmen sent Portland police anonymous letters demanding that the
police take care of the tongs.132 According to Wen-hsien Chen, a sociologist, many
arrests of Chinese people by immigration authorities began with grievances from their
fellow Chinese neighbors within the community. Chen disputes the stereotype portraying
Chinese immigrant communities as always unified by revealing that Chinese residents
often sent letters or made phone calls complaining or informing on their neighbors to the
local police.133 Particularly during the time of Exclusion, the role of police became a
force to unify Chinese residents, as well as an avenue to seek revenge against a neighbor.
Tong illegal activity involved non-Chinese people as well. American and other
immigrant men frequented fan tan and gambling rooms.134 They also purchased opium
from Chinese suppliers. Local police and city leaders also participated in the illicit
pleasures offered in Chinatown. A Portland native, Evelyn Low Ching’s father owned a
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tailor shop that turned into a front for a gambling room. She recalled that police officers
and detectives often came into gamble during the day. Her father would slip them cards,
that she later realized was a payoff from her father to the officials. In return these men
gave advance warning of raids.135 While it is unclear if Ching’s father claimed tong
membership, the participation of city leaders in illegal activities in Chinatown is
important for recognizing the complicated relationship of Chinatown to the larger
community. Gambling, opium, and other illegal businesses appealed to many Chinese
because they could not legally own land and faced discrimination in the job market.136
Illegal activities frequently created discord between tongs. Disputes over
gambling often led to skirmishes between the tongs. In response, local police officers
frequently patrolled Chinatown to prevent a tong war.137 Regardless of how the conflict
began, tongs called upon specific members, called the boo how doy, to do the actual
fighting. The boo how doy, also known as the “hatchetmen” or “highbinders,” acted as
the members responsible for physical fighting. These men acted as enforcers for tong law
and decisions. Famous throughout tongs and Chinese communities, the fighters took on a
mythologized status. Stories described men who commonly traveled to the different
branches, going wherever conflict arose. When fighting did break out, local police forces
concentrated their efforts on finding and arresting the boo how doy. However, in
Chinatowns, various systems warned the fighters of approaching police officers.138

Evelynn Low Ching, “Oral History”, December 12, 1994. Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.
Rose Lee Hum, “The Decline of Chinatowns in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology 54,
no. 5 (Mar., 1949), 422.
137
“Police Fear Tong Trouble,” The Seattle Star, January 30, 1915.
138
Eng Gong and Bruce Grant’s Tong War! (New York: Nicholas L. Brown, 1930), 105.
135
136

57

Absolute secrecy prevailed in Chinatown as residents refused to give information as to
their location. Best known for their loyalty and dedication to the tongs, leadership could
depend on their fighters to finish their assignments, such as shooting a rival tong member,
even if it that ended with their arrest.
Arrests, interrogations, and court cases frequently plagued tongs, especially when
rival organizations physically fought one another. As such, a tong’s success relied on two
key individuals: the attorney and interpreter. If arrested, tongs provided their men with
lawyers to defend them at the group’s expense. The attorney and interpreter enjoyed high
status within a tong since they assisted the group with legal troubles and kept the
members out of prison. For example, in 1905, Attorney Leroy Anderson kept Charley
Lee and Lee Ding out of jail after they set fire to a building in Arizona. A third in their
party, Smiley Lung confessed and gave evidence as to the involvement of the other two
men. Despite this, the attorney successfully won the case and the judge declared Lee
Ding and Charley Lee not guilty.139 Without the assistance of the tong’s attorney, the
three men probably would have been found guilty and served time.
Discriminatory laws and racist practices created a need for groups like tongs and
other mutual aid societies to protect themselves. The passage of the Exclusion Act in
1882 solidified their presence and importance in Chinese communities. By marking
Chinese people as the ultimate “undesirable,” the US government sought to curtail
Chinese immigration.140 Nevertheless, Chinese people still hoped to migrate to the US
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and inadvertently paved the way for a new opportunity for people to make money. The
system of illegal immigration involved residents of the Chinatowns, corrupt custom
officials, lawyers, and third-party groups. Exclusion allowed for merchants to claim a
new social status. Merchants in late Qing China did not belong to high society. However,
in the United States, as part of the permitted groups allowed entry, merchants gained new
social standing, which many used to become key figures in immigration and leaders in
the Chinatown. Alongside individual merchants, Chinese associations competed for
power and control in the community. Chinese immigrant organizations existed long
before the Exclusion Act, beginning with the earliest groups created in the 1850s as
hopeful Chinese arrived in California to work the mines, but during the Exclusion era
they became central to the Chinese community. More men joined tongs and conflict
between tongs grew, predominantly over control of unlawful activities. These conflicts
led to the creation of the Chinese Peace Society in 1912, created to mitigate tensions and
negotiate peace between rivaling Chinese groups. Branches of the society existed in
Portland, San Francisco, and New York City.141

Tong Wars
The 1917 Tong War in Portland demonstrates how an organization filled an ethnic
niche made possible by discriminatory and neglectful government, racism, and the needs
of Chinese men to belong within a culturally relevant community and access traditional
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forms of masculinity. Secondly, it shows the influences that Chinatowns and tong
networks in Washington and California had upon Portland’s Chinese district. Thirdly, it
reveals the difficulty of government in reclaiming authority, legitimacy, and control over
a group after failing to provide for the needs of the community. Lastly, the war exposes
how Chinese leaders, highbinders, residents, and local government officials negotiated
power in Portland. This negotiation is visible as the tongs defied the local government, as
the local government attempted to reassert control over Chinatown through threats and
arrests, and subsequently during the peace agreements as both government and tongs
sought to dominate the discussions.
Low scale strife characterized tong relations in Portland, specifically during the
twentieth century. However, more serious conflict began in 1916. In February fighting
broke out supposedly over a disagreement over a slave girl between the Bow Leong and
Hop Sings’ tongs in San Francisco. An alliance of the Bow Leongs, Bing Kongs, and
Suey Sings formed to fight against the Hop Sings.142 Hostilities continued to escalate
between the tongs in Seattle and Portland, even after San Francisco members of the Bing
Kong and Hop Sings tongs met and signed a truce.143 Fighting came full circle as
aggression renewed in San Francisco during early March. Tong members began to carry
babies with them in public, as a protection against highbinders, as highbinders had an
“unwritten law…that a father with a child in his arms shall not be shot.”144 A call for a
Grand Jury took place and wealthy merchants attended in discussing how to end the
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conflict and protect the Chinatown.145 Later that month, tensions between the tongs
declined across California, Washington, and Oregon. 1916’s Tong War across the Pacific
coast shows that tong networks often extended the struggle, both geographically and
temporally, and that different areas understood the war differently as the primary cause of
discord became secondary to the regional problems. For this reason, tong wars ended in
one city, while continuing in another, as branches of the various tongs primarily saw the
struggle in a local sense, rather than the larger whole. The 1916 conflict which
purportedly began over a disagreement about a woman in San Francisco, took on a local
importance for Portland tongs in February with the killing of local Chinatown resident
Chung Wah.146
A few isolated fights occurred in subsequent months, but relative peace existed in
Chinatowns. November began with new fears of a tong war about to break out over
claims that members of the Suey Sings tong robbed a gambling resort. Four major tong
leaders negotiated a settlement and prevented a war of retaliation.147 Tensions ran high
for the next couple weeks as fear of further violence worried Portland officials, Chinese
residents, and other cities across the West coast.148 A few months later, in early 1917, the
worst tong war in years commenced with the shooting on February 8th.
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Portland’s Tong War of 1917
After the shooting, the local police department swiftly jumped into action.
Officers, in plain clothes, descended on Chinatown and contacted leaders in the Chinese
community. This shooting was not a simple disagreement turned shootout between any
Chinese residents. The participants belonged to rival tongs including members of Hip
Sings and Bow Leongs against men belonging to the Suey Sing Tong. With the conflict
labeled a tong battle, Portland officials felt the urgent need to control and diffuse the
situation, both within and outside Chinatown. Fear of the tong battle spreading to other
Chinatowns and becoming a war worried many, as past events proved how easily a local
disagreement could become an interregional conflict, difficult to stamp out.
As the tongs spread, so did the conflict between the opposing groups. As such,
disagreement between tongs in one city could quickly travel and inflame all tong
branches and Chinatowns across the West Coast. Like a wild fire, tong battles proved to
inflame quickly; spreading discord, violence, and fear to all tong chapters, further inciting
discord, violence, and fear, creating a cyclical effect that made it difficult to resolve. This
made peace negotiations and outside control by police and city officials difficult to attain.
Newspapers could quickly turn any violent action between Chinese residents into
reports of a ‘tong war.’ Such reporting reflected white fears of Chinese violence as well
as the association many American citizens made between the Chinese and violence.
However, between tong members, small conflicts swiftly developed into more serious
struggles. Clashes could quickly escalate overnight. A fight between tong members in
one city could grow into a conflict composed of all tong members and allied tong
associations. The 1917 tong war is the perfect example of this. A shooting took place in
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Portland’s Chinatown and the next morning, newspapers declared a tong war. Soon other
parts of the Pacific Coast, with significant Chinese immigrant populations, feared that the
fighting would spread into their own communities.
Chinese residents and the Portland officials knew that a war had been sparked by
the shooting of February 8th. Portland city police acted quickly, arresting thirty Chinese
residents after the shooting. The police department released most prisoners, with a small
number held on “minor charges pending investigation.” The police also raided the Hip
sing headquarters. While at the headquarters, the phone rang, and the police answered,
intercepting a call intended for Hip Sing members from the Seattle branch. Police officers
could not understand the Chinese being spoken on the phone and hung up after refusing
to let Portland branch leaders take the call.149
Shootings between the warring tongs spread and resulted in the death of Harry
Wong in Seattle, Washington and another man in San Jose, California.150 These two
murders occurred within two days of the Portland shooting and death of M. Len. Fearing
further bloodshed, Portland city official, Deputy District Attorney Ryan, quickly issued a
threat that raids of Chinatown would begin and wholesale arrests of all tong men would
occur if shootings continued.151
City officials commonly issued threats to warring tongs in hopes of ending the
violence. But tongs usually turned a deaf ear to the police even as they threatened to
dismantle their associations and arrest of their members. Most of the time threats focused
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on the tongs themselves, but at times city leaders would threaten the Chinese community
as a whole in hopes of pressuring the tongs into negotiating peace. Methods such as this
called upon wealthy merchants and other prominent leaders in Chinatown to use their
influence with the people to broker peace. Due to the severity of these threats, officials
rarely turned to these methods. However, Portland officials opted for this route in 1917.
The actions of San Francisco leaders five years earlier, in ending a Tong War in
California in 1912, influenced this decision.
At the time in San Francisco, the Suey Sings, Sen Suey Ngs, and Hip Sings
aligned together against the Hop Sings. In February, the Chief of Police D.A. White
delivered an ultimatum to the tongs via a letter sent to Consul General Li Yung Yew and
Secretary Wong Sam of the Six Companies. The ultimatum stated that if the tongs “have
any regard for the welfare of the Chinese in general” they will agree to peace within
twenty-four hours and present an agreement to the merchant organization. The agreement
then needed to be on his desk by the next day. If the tongs did not agree to such
conditions, White would have police patrols around the Chinatown to keep away white
visitors and threatened that “Chinatown will be blockaded and literally starved out as far
as the white patronage is concerned.” As the fighting occurred around the time of the
Chinese New Year, White also refused to approve the use of firecrackers for the
celebration.152 The threat brought the tongs to the table, where they brokered peace, for a
time.
In 1917, Deputy Ryan’s threat against Portland tongs was neither out of the

152

“Chief Delivers an Ultimatum to Chinatown,” The San Francisco Call, February 12, 1912.

64

ordinary, nor particularly successful. Ryan followed his plan, but he was surprised by the
result. On February 11th, only three days after the war broke out in Portland’s streets,
numerous Chinese residents posted notices written on red rice paper to the
neighborhood’s bulletins. These notices declared the neutrality of peaceful Chinese and
made mention that they did not belong to any tong nor had tong affiliations.153 The
community members posted their statements with the hopes that by declaring themselves
neutral, they would be protected from becoming targets of tong violence. These
declarations of neutrality demonstrated the already waning power of the tongs in the
community as individual residents voiced their noninvolvement in the conflict.
As residents of the Chinese district posted their notices of neutrality, many tong
members, especially those in leadership roles left the city, with other members, primarily
the tong fighters, arrived in Portland.154 Rumors about groups of gunmen, from between
seven to seventy-five, were headed from San Francisco to Portland to fight in the war.155
In anticipation of their arrival, tong leaders and wealthy merchants went into hiding in
Chinatown while others ostensibly fled to seek cannery jobs in Astoria and other parts of
Oregon. Police Captain Inskeep noted that none of them looked like cannery hands or
laborers of any sorts. He also noted that in the tong conflict of the previous year, a group
of Chinese had given the same excuse for their sudden exodus from town.156
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Over the next couple days, officers arrested five men they suspected to have tong
connections. Three came from Seattle, one from Portland, and one was preparing to leave
for China. The police confiscated two revolvers from Yuen Wong, the Portland resident
who officials considered to be a member of the Hop Sing. Wong denied any connections
with the tong.157 A couple days later, Deputy Ryan arrested ten more Chinese men
outside of Salem suspected of belonging to the tongs. Seven of the men came from San
Francisco and the others claimed they lived in Portland.158 Newspapers reported that
leaders of other western cities with Chinatowns worried about movement of Chinese men
as well. In Seattle, police officers made their fifth arrest by February 13th and announced
that many gunmen from Portland and San Francisco travelled to Seattle to partake in the
Chinatown battles.159
Newspapers were mostly silent about the events that provoked their arrests. What
is apparent in these arrests and the decisions of police is the wariness of authorities that
accompanied Chinese movement. Their inability to distinguish tong men from other
Chinese immigrants or Chinese-Americans cast suspicion upon all male Chinese
residents.
In all the chaos of fighting, fleeing, and declaring neutrality, peace negotiations
could not begin. The Suey Sing tong maintained “their right to blood money or blood,
with battle as the only other choice.”160 Loyalty to fellow tong brothers and retribution
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for the death of any member proved central to the tong societies. They could not agree to
a peace plan until tongs felt that each tong suffered equally, and that each upheld the
pride of their association.161 This combined the fraternal nature of the tongs with the
promise for individual physical and financial protection from enemies; both within
Chinese communities and outside in the larger American society. The tongs’ existence
depended on the loyalty of its members and its ability to uphold their promises. For their
loyalty, members received physical and economic protection, a sense of belonging, as
well as legal assistance if one ended up in prison.
As the majority of tong members left Portland, those who stayed behind looked
after the tong headquarters and managed the highbinders. Chinatown appeared as a ghost
town by mid-February. Streets were empty and doors remained locked. Numerous
detectives and police officers stood watch in the district, ever ready for a tong showdown,
knowing the Suey Sing’s need for retaliation.162 This desire for reprisal kept the tongs
from negotiating peace agreements.
Although the tongs grew out of a distrust and discontentment of the Chinese Six
Companies, during times of conflict the organization successfully positioned itself as an
intermediary between warring tongs during peace negotiations. In part, the mediatory role
of the Six Companies grew out of their rapport with local government leaders, as mayors
often invited or expected the Six Companies to take care of the problem. Local leaders of
tongs and other pertinent Chinese organizations travelled to San Francisco for these
meetings, where the main branches of the association and tongs existed. On February
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17th, representatives of the Hip Sing and Suey Sing tongs, along with their allies, met at
the building of the Chinese Benevolent Association, in Portland, with members of the
Chinese Peace Society, to broker an agreement.163 After several hours the meeting ended.
Hostilities continued and peace eluded the conference. Contrary to the typical distrust
between tong members and the police, the representatives requested police protection
when they arrived at the summit on February 17th. When a threat by another tong
appeared serious enough, associating with the police could be permitted, albeit in very
limited situations.

Opposing the Local Government
Aggressions between the tongs continued for the rest of February and into March.
Towards the end of March, the Mayor of Portland issued an ultimatum to the four tongs
involved in the war. Mayor Albee sought the end of the confrontation and he planned on
using the entire Chinese community as his bargaining chip. Together with Mayor
Anderson of The Dalles and Acting Mayor Curtis of Astoria, Mayor Albee issued an
ultimatum that a peace agreement needed to be signed. The Mayor required the Hip Sing,
Suey Sing, Hop Sing, and Bing Kung-Bow Leong tongs to send representatives to a
meeting and come out with a peace pact agreed upon and signed by the Presidents and
secretaries of the implicated tongs within forty-eight hours. If tongs did not agree to
peace within the allotted time, Mayor Albee stated that he would have the police sent into
the Chinese district and begin arresting all Chinese residents on site; regardless of age,
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gender, or tong affiliation. The people would then be held in jail until each could prove
their legal right to being in the United States.164
Here the conflict between tongs collided with the Exclusion Act. By threatening
wholesale arrests of Chinese people, the mayor used the Act’s prohibition on Chinese
laborers, and other barred peoples, as a bargaining chip against the tongs, believing many
residents within Chinatown to be in violation of this law. By threatening not only tong
members, but all Chinese within Portland, Mayor Albee escalated demands made in
previous tong wars and even those threats made earlier by Deputy Ryan. At this moment,
Mayor Albee threatened to deprive all Chinese immigrants and even their native-born
children of their personal and civic rights.
The combined threat of action against all Chinese residents in Portland drew the
tongs to the table to discuss peace. The four tongs signed an agreement to keep the peace
for a minimum of thirty days while they negotiated a long-term plan. The tong
representatives also pledged to refuse “aid, assistance, countenance or shelter to any of
their members or others who shall violate any of the covenants here in contained.” They
also promised to provide law enforcement officers with any information about members
who violated the peace agreements or conducted illegal acts.165
A month later, on April 26th, tong presidents and secretaries signed the formal
peace agreement and put it on the Mayor’s desk.166 In it contained additional clauses
discussing the terms of armistice. Each tong agreed to end the violence. Another part of
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the arrangement resolved to end future disagreements peaceably and without physical
harm to others. The Portland branches of the tongs agreed to not participate in tong
actions and fighting in other cities. Leaders also agreed to turn in any member of their
tongs who violated the peace agreements. With the four signatures of the tong secretaries
accompanied by the signature of the presidents of each tong, these men gave the
appearance of turning over a new leaf for the Chinese community in Portland. The
Mayor’s threats seemed successful. Portland’s control over the Chinese community and
the tong groups looked absolute. The quasi-political organizations of the Chinese people
seemed to fall in line with the desires and authority of Portland officials.
However, peace and control over the tongs proved short-lived. What looked like
as a success of government authority in controlling a marginalized people, soon revealed
itself to be otherwise. Within weeks, tongs renewed the fighting with the Suey Sing Tong
battling with the Kung-Bow Leong Tong in the streets of Portland. This fight left three
men dead and five injured.167 The Mayor’s authority and police coercion proved
insufficient to end the conflict. Only Chinese community leaders negotiating on their own
terms would bring the Tong War of 1917 to an end.
The Tong War of 1917 reveals how Chinese community leaders negotiated power
and control with local, state, and federal government. Control of Chinatown between the
government and the Chinese themselves fluctuated during the late nineteenth and first
half of the twentieth century. This power struggle was further shaped by racism and racial
conflicts between the Chinese immigrant community and the larger white community of
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the region. It also highlights ways in which power is constructed between marginalized
people and government. Governmental neglect and discrimination led to the creation of
Chinese quasi-governmental organizations. At times, governmental authority sought to
assert control over the Chinese community. However, these attempts proved ineffective
because the government denied aid and essential services to the community. Instead,
auxiliary groups filled these needs. In this way Chinese merchants and organizations,
like tongs, became the intercessory figures between the immigrant groups and the US
government.
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CHAPTER IV
TONG TRANSITIONS: THE CHANGING NEEDS OF MEMBERS AND
COMMUNITY
“The Tong stands forth as the strongest organization to promote the welfare of the
Chinese in America. The only drawback is the tong war with its dread toll of lives. But I
feel, as every other Chinese feels, that these wars are to become a thing of the past, and
that the pages of tong history will no longer record such bloody deeds as those of Hong
Ah Kay, Sing Dock, Big Queue Wai, Yee Toy, and scores of other highbinders, and
hatchetmen, and gunmen.”
-

Eng Ying Gong, 1930168

The Chinese tongs developed as Chinese immigrants sought mutual protection
and aid. Contesting US government authority as well as control by other Chinese
organizations, the tongs became the central power of Chinatown during the late
nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries. Yet, as the twentieth century
progressed, their role in the community changed as the Chinese became more successful
in fighting back against discriminatory laws and practices. As they did so, the tong’s
power in the community ebbed. The tong wars died out and the tongs themselves
transitioned into more traditional fraternal organizations. As the tong influence declined
in Chinatown, the Consolidated Chinese Benevolent Association (previously known as
the Six Companies) reemerged as the clear leader of Chinatown.169 The 1917 Tong War
in Portland marks the changes within tongs, the decline of tong wars, as well as the
success of the Chinese in combating racism.
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Unsettled Peace and the Continuation of Conflict
In April 1917, Mayor Albee seemed unstoppable. Under threat of widescale
arrests, he successfully brought the warring tongs together at the end of March,
convincing them to sign a thirty day’s armistice. Violence on the streets of Portland’s
Chinatown stopped. Business picked up, people walked the streets, and the Mayor could
claim the victory.
Mayor Albee’s actions inspired others city mayors to act as well. Mayor Gill of
Seattle decided to hold a conference for the branches of the rival tongs in Washington
and sign a truce. Rather than threatening widescale arrests, Portland’s mayor, Gill stated
“I intend to break up Chinese meetings, and if necessary close their tong halls and
temples.” This he claimed would be more effective because most of those involved were
actually Chinese Americans, not immigrants.170 Even Los Angeles followed suit, after
tongs in Portland signed the permanent peace pact in late April. On May 5th, newspapers
wrote that Mayor Woodman successfully brought the rival tongs together and convinced
them to sign a treaty of peace for thirty days. “When they concluded this pact, I told them
that unless that treaty were made permanent and that the tong violence cease in Los
Angeles I would clean every mother’s son of a Chinese out of the city under the
provisions of the new immigration laws.”171 Under the threat of arrest, deportation, or
destruction of property, each Mayor individually brought the warring tongs of their city
to the negotiation table. The Spring of 1917 seemed to herald the end of tong wars.
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Over the next thirty days Portland’s tongs worked to turn their temporary truce
into permanent peace. At times, armistice seemed so close, at others times peace seemed
almost ready to fall apart. At these moments, Mayor Albee reissued his threats against the
tongs and Chinatown. On April 24th, with only six days left of the truce between the
warring tongs, Mayor Albee promised that without a signed pact for permanent peace, he
was prepared to begin an “anti-tong war crusade” on May first. On that day, officers
would go around Chinatown and destroy the tong men’s quarters.172 As the end of the
month, and peace, drew near, Mayor Albee called for a conference at his office, on April
26th, between the rival tongs, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, the
Chinese Peace Society, himself, the District Attorney, along with other state and federal
representatives.
However, on the morning of the 26th, the four tong presidents, Chan Jung Tung
of the Suey Sings, Young Toon of the Hop Sings, Moi Ling of the Bing Kong Bow
Leongs, and Young Gee of the Hip Sings, joined together at the office of District
Attorney Evans and signed their own peace pact.173 While complying with the Mayor’s
demands, they asserted their own power and authority by ensuring the Mayor’s absence
in the signed agreement. This peace pact, also lacking signatures of other non-tong
influential Chinese leaders, such as representatives from the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association and the Chinese Peace Society, reasserted tong importance in
Chinatown, while marginalizing the control and influence of other associations in tong
affairs.
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Portland tongs exhibited power in signing the peace pact of April 26th, by
controlling when they signed and the officials involved in the signing. By including
District Attorney Evans, the tongs guaranteed the acceptance to the pact. As a
government official, District Attorney Evans’ signature provided a legitimacy to the
peace pact that the local government could not contest. By including only one
government signature, the tongs reasserted that tongs controlled the conflict and the
negotiation for peace, showing that peace would only be achieved on the terms of the
tongs. They would not be pushed around.
Mayor Albee still held his planned afternoon meeting, in which Sheriff Hulbert,
Immigration Inspector Bonham, City Detective Tichenor, and representatives from the
CCBA and the Chinese Peace Society attended.174 Chinese officials not included in the
peace pact of April 26th warned the community that their lack of signatures weakened the
binding nature of the pact and it might not hold. Le Ne Gim, president of the Chinese
Peace Society told the Mayor that “I feel that the pact was not signed in the proper place
or in the proper spirit, and may not amount to much.” However, despite those concerns,
the pact was legitimate in the eyes of local, state, and federal authorities.175
Peace did not last. On June 2nd fighting broke out between Suey Sings and Bing
Kung Bow Leongs, with over a dozen Chinese fighting in the streets of Portland. The
battle left Chin Hong, a middle-aged influential merchant, and Chung Chow dead. Both
belonged to the Bing Kung Bow Leong tong. The fighting also mortally wounded another
member of the Bing Kung Bow Leong tong, along with an additional five people injured,
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including some white citizens.176 The police brought numerous Chinese men into custody
during the aftermath, including Yee Guk and Suey Fong. Three weeks later, the Portland
Police formally arrested Fung Lee, Guk Yee, Fung Shew, and Ju Low, for murder. The
police also arrested Low, but only held him for ‘investigation.’177 The next day the
District Attorney issued more warrants for the arrests of numerous officers and members
of the Hop Sing and Suey Sing tongs, including their presidents, Yung Toon, and Chan
Jung Tung respectively. The police also detained Quon Sam, who worked as an
interpreter for the tongs, Gong Wo and Lee Jan, both Suey Sing tong members, along
with five other men associated with the Hop Sing and Suey Sing tongs.178 With these
warrants, Mayor Albee, the District Attorney’s office, and Portland police changed
tactics. No longer did the police only arrest the gunmen involved, but began arresting the
leaders of the tongs as well, charging them with violating the peace treaty. Frustrated
with the continuing violence, Mayor Albee promised he would “even transgress his
power in the effort to wipe the gangs of murderers from Portland.”179 The next day he
continued with “I am going to bat with these Chinese murderers just as strong as the law
will permit, and maybe a little stronger, if the law is not lenient enough…”180
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Tong War in the Courtroom
From here, the war not only changed between the tongs themselves, but also
between the tongs and local government. The summer months of 1917 saw less violence
and street fights than earlier in the year, but that did not mean the end of the war. The
violence changed venues instead. Now, the war continued in the courtroom. During the
summer, the District Attorney targeted several tong men for their roles in the war. Hop
Sing gunman, Lee Yin, spent early June in court, on trial for murder charges. On June 9th
the jury found him not guilty.181 Judge Gatens heard the trial of Wong Wen Teung,
another Hop Sing gunman, charged with the murder of Joseph Gue from March 27th. The
trial began on June 19th and by June 27th the jury found him guilty after only one hour of
deliberation.182
The various players interpreted the courtroom scene in several ways. For the new
Mayor, George Baker, along with Chief Deputy District Attorney Collier the court trials
against tong members signified the government’s upper hand in stamping out the tongs
and controlling the area. For the tongs, the courtroom became an extension of the fighting
taking place on the streets. By June the Suey Sing and Hop Sing tongs had injured and
killed more Bing Kung Bow Leong men than vice versa. For the Bing Kung Bow
Leongs, who lost seven more men than the Suey Sings, the court room became an
opportunity to even that score. The Bing Kung Bow Leong’s attorney, Dan Malarkey,
joined in as a special prosecutor, in the case against Wong Wen Tueng, seeking a murder
conviction as form of retribution.
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In retaliation, the Hop Sings stationed two heavily armed members outside the
courthouse’s entrance. Deputy Sheriff Phillips arrested them and contrary to normal
police-tong interactions, the men informed the police of their names, Jung Hing and
Ching Sing, openly declaring their membership in the Bing Kung Bow Leong tong. They
confessed that their purpose at the courthouse was to kill both Moy Ham and Quon Sam,
the interpreter and high-ranking members of the Hop Sings. As discussed by the local
newspaper, the veracity of this story runs into some problems. As attorney Malarkey
pointed out, tong men rarely, if ever, freely admitted membership in tongs to police
officers. Typically, members denied any tong association when confronted by police.
Also, the men at the courthouse were conspicuously armed, not bothering to hid their
weapons.183 Tong members usually concealed their weapons, and logically would have
done so in close proximity to the courthouse. The aggressive nature outside the
courthouse, along with the quick confession, led many to believe the two men actually
belonged to Hop Sing tong and were posing as Bing Kung Bow Leong tong members.
When Yin Lee walked free, the Bing Kung Bow Leongs lost another round
against the Suey Sings and Hop Sings. Frustrated at the news, tong members went to
battle in the streets of Portland. On July 18th, rival tong members murdered Back Lee.184
Since the renewal of violence in June, a grand jury began investigations into the tong war
and charged more Chinese men.185 By August, this led to the arrests various leaders of
the four tongs for conspiracy and approving of murder. These tong leaders entered jail
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without bail. Collier hoped this police action would bring about another peace treaty. He
told the incarcerated men that he could recommend their release and postpone their trials
indefinitely, but only if they signed a permanent peace pact. This meant that only the
actual gunmen charged with murder would be prosecuted. However, releasing the tong
leaders was conditional. If they broke the treaty, they would be tried under those
indictments again.186 No such peace agreement ever materialized.
An agreement for permanent peace finally came in the beginning of September.
Officials and representatives met in San Francisco and signed a pact purposed to bring
about peace throughout all of the Pacific Coast. Seemingly directed from higher levels
within the tongs, leaders in San Francisco then forwarded the peace agreement to the
other branches and on September 13th, Portland tongs recognized the legitimacy of the
peace pact by posting notices of it throughout Chinatown. Officers then signed a
ratification of the peace pact affirming their commitment to its terms.187 This peace pact
held while previous ones failed due to several reasons. First, all tongs had tired of the war
after racking up expensive bills as the fight lasted longer than anticipated. Secondly, the
leaders, both locally and at the headquarters in San Francisco approved the peace pact,
posting notice of it throughout the cities. Thirdly, the pact succeeded because the tongs
agreed on a ceasefire and their genuine desire for peace, rather than government bullying
tactics, brought them to the negotiating table.
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The Death of Tong Wars
The 1917 conflict was not the last of the tong wars. During the early 1920’s
another war broke out. However, the frequency of tong wars decreased and over time
they stopped altogether. In the 1920s, fewer stories covered conflict in the Chinese
community. Furthermore, articles about tong wars ceased to be front page news,
relegated to the back pages. 188 As newspapers impact and mirror community interests
and beliefs, this change shows that the tongs are seen as less of a threat, and violence
within Chinatown less interesting, as the twentieth century progressed. Another tong war
occurred in the early 1920s along the west coast, but afterwards, it seems that tong wars
stopped completely, with only one war in New York around the early 1930s. The tong
wars that began in the 1880s and many thought a regular occurrence within Chinatowns
stopped completely within roughly a decade.189
Despite reduced press attention, conflict continued between Portland’s tongs, but
they changed how they settled disagreements. In Winter of 1918, tongs and the larger
Chinese community feared the end of the peace founded in the previous year due to a
disagreement between the Suey Sings and Hop Sings over a purported payment of $4000
due to the Hop Sings by the Suey Sings. Rather than erupting in violence, the two tongs
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met and negotiated an immediate payment of $800 instead. This arrangement
successfully kept the peace between the tongs, despite their history of animosity.190
Instead of being threatened into negotiations hosted at a government location, the tongs
met at their headquarters and brought District Attorney Evans into the meeting. Tong
conflict and negotiations began to transform.
Another change for mediating conflict between tongs occurred in Portland 1921.
That year, another tong war broke out across the Pacific Coast, beginning with battles in
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Stockton.191 The same day that newspapers reported the
violence in California, representatives of the Hop Sing and Bing Kong Bow Leong tongs
gathered together with District Attorney Evans in Portland and composed a preemptive
peace pact. Sue Key Ling, president of the Hop Sings, along with secretary Moy Ham
endorsed the agreement; as did President Moy Ling and secretary Louis Chung for the
Bing Kong Bow Leongs. Wong Yuen also signed as a representative as the Peace
Society. With all the necessary signatures present on the pact, the tongs sent the
document around to the smaller tongs across the state; for the agreement pledged all
tongs within Oregon to a state of peace.192 Again, in this meeting, the tongs invited
District Attorney Evans, rather than Evans forcing the tongs together.
Not only did tongs leaders begin settling disagreements without explicit violence
(at least most of the time) and keep Portland and the surrounding region away from the
larger tong conflicts of the West Coast, but the leaders also permitted government

“Chinese Dispute Settled,” Oregonian, December 11, 1918.
“3 Slain, 5 Wounded In New Tongs War,” Oregonian, February 16, 1921.
192
“Tongs Sign Peace Pact,” Oregonian, February 17, 1921.
190
191

81

authorities to continue taking part in their peace negotiations. In both of these examples,
local tong leaders invited District Attorney Evans to be present and assist in the meeting.
Rather than being pushed around, tongs exhibited agency in the ways they addressed
conflict, and at times worked alongside government officials, on their own terms, to settle
quarrels.
Scholars have offered numerous explanations for why tong wars end by the 1930s
and why tong influence in Chinatowns declined. Some historians focused on tong wars as
unique to San Francisco during the 1880s -1890s. This myopic lens led to a conclusion
that tong wars ceased due to the destruction of brothels, opium dens, and gambling rooms
operated by the tongs in the San Francisco earthquake of 1906.193 This deprived tongs of
income and any further conflicts ended with the creation of the Chinese Peace Society in
1913, growth of merchant class power, rejection and suppression of the tongs by local
police.194 This argument is problematic because vice activities continued well after the
earthquake of 1906 in San Francisco. While the Chinese Peace Society may have helped
end tong wars, the creation of the organization did not mark the end of the violent
conflicts. Also, the juxtaposition of tong influence to merchant power ignores that many
leading merchants in Chinese communities belonged to tongs.195 Rather than being at
odds with one another, interests of tongs and merchants frequently aligned, particularly
when merchants held leadership roles in tongs. Another argument states that tong power
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declined due to increased governmental control of Chinatown as figures such as Sergeant
Manion constantly arrested tong members for illegal activities at every opportunity.196
While increased patrol of Chinatown could impact crime rates and tong activities, this is
overly simplistic and disregards the multifaceted ways in which tong influence declined.
Others reasoned that tong wars stopped due to the transition of Chinatowns’ vice
operations to a growth of tourism that required a more sanitized version of Chinatown.
Sociologist Ivan Light argues that Chinese merchants desired tourism and this conflicted
with tong operation of vice activities. In the end the merchants won out and seeing the
success of tourism, tongs join in tourism as well.197 This, Light claims, represents a shift
in the public demand of what was wanted from Chinatown.198 It is true that tourism did
change Chinatown. While tourism and the desire for white clientele did play a role in
changing Chinatown, Chinese restaurants and promises of participating in recreational
vice, while maintaining anonymity already brought a male, white clientele to most
Chinatowns.199 The tourism of the twentieth century also emphasized seedier qualities of
Chinatown, while downplaying other parts.
Various forms of vice are found in almost every community, and portrayals of
Chinatown as a place of illicit activities relies on stereotypes and disregards the complex
nature of the community. Such portrayals as seen in the play “The East is East and the
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West is West” pushed such stereotypes in the twentieth century to which Chinese
residents criticized the uncivilized portrayal of Chinese in the United States and rebuked
any Chinese that participated in such representations, both in plays and tourist
performances.200 These depictions that played upon racialized stereotypes, whether in
film and pictures reinforced negative biases and the idea of what Colburn and Pozzetta
describe as the “innate criminality” many associated with immigrant and ethnic minority
groups.201 Tourism reinforced many of these perceptions as Chinatown guides displayed
fake opium dens, tong battles, lepers, and told stories about the hatchetmen of
Chinatown.202 Over time, Chinatowns came to depend upon the tourism industry
financially which incentivized residents to play into racial stereotypes and the perceived
mystery of the community.203
More recent explanations include a series of changes to explain the decline of the
tongs. Historian Scott Seligman argues that the onset of the Great Depression forced
tongs to turn inward to address the needs of their members, coupled with a demographic
shift within Chinatown that weakened the position of tong in the community.204 The
Great Depression caused everyone to change their spending habits and focus more on
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needs than wants. It is logical that tongs and their members experienced a similar shift.
While this may signify a transition of tong attention, it does not explain why the tongs
began to change and tong wars declined from early on in the 1920s. Characterized as the
“Roaring Twenties,” American society experienced increases in wealth and excess in the
1920s, yet it is during this time that tongs began to change. For Seligman the Great
Depression is the lynchpin, but that does not fit with the changes beginning over a decade
prior to the Great Depression. Also, such a need as created by the Great Depression
should increase rather than weaken the importance and power of the tongs, since
members would turn to them for assistance. This is visible in other forms of organized
crime in the United States during the Great Depression. During that era, crime rates rose
as more gangs developed across the United States and Canada due to men seeking out
new forms of economic survival.205 Ronald Takaki argues that the turn to tourism and the
Great Depression go hand in hand. He argues that Chinatown turned to an increased
centrality of tourism to combat the effects of the Great Depression experienced by
Chinese residents.
The second part of Seligman’s argument is more convincing. Certainly, the
demographic shift impacted Chinatown as a whole, but also the tongs within. While this
demographic shift played an important role, it is a symptom rather than the cause for the
decline of tong power in Chinatown. The tongs’ influence waned due to the increased
success of Chinese residents in fighting against discriminatory laws, along with a
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subsequent growth of opportunities outside the tongs. 206 The courthouse became an
important space to combat racial discrimination.
As discussed by historian Sucheng Chan, Chinese immigrants fought against
discrimination in the courts. During the period of exclusion, Chan records more than
1,100 cases involving Chinese plaintiffs or defendants.207 These cases centered on the
issues of exclusion, right of naturalization, and economic discrimination. While many of
these cases involved organizations like the Chinese Six Companies, numerous residents
filed suits on their own.208 California merchant, Wu Wah hired a personal lawyer after
immigration officials sought to arrest Wah and his wife in 1932. The couple sold their
business and fled, moving from place to place over the next five years. Finally, in 1937
Wu Wah hired W.H. Wilkinson to represent them. With his help, the couple’s arrest
warrants were annulled, along with the orders for deportation.209 Others joined unions,
striking alongside fellow workers. In 1936, around 3,000 Chinese sailors joined the
National Maritime Union in New York, in their strike for better pay, equal treatment, and
the right for Chinese sailors to shore leave.210Lastly, Chinese residents fought against not
only legislative discrimination, but also against the power and control of Chinatown
leaders and organizations. In the 1930s, Chinese laundrymen in New York banded
together and created the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance after neglect from The Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association. The new group hired their own lawyers to fight
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discriminatory ordinances rather than turn to the CCBA.211
The reasons for the end of tong wars and declining tong influence in communities
is more nuanced. Money was one such reason. Finances motivated tongs to end their
conflicts.212 Newspapers, time and time again, discussed the desertion of Chinatown
during tong wars. The streets became empty and many Chinese even left the city for The
Dalles or Tacoma. As a result, businesses suffered. People stayed at home rather than
visit stores, leaving goods unpurchased and restaurants unvisited. The longer a tong war
lasted, the longer that Chinese employees and employers suffered monetarily. The
merchants within the ranks of tongs especially felt the economic pressure of continued
conflict and benefited from ending tong wars.
Along with money not going in to businesses, conducting a tong war came with a
hefty price tag attached to it. Tong wars cost a lot of money and tongs hemorrhaged
money. They paid gunmen, purchased guns, bullets, and other weapons, hired lawyers,
and payed bribes. All of these added up. Leong Gor Yun in discussing the end of a tong
war in New York stated both tongs wanted to end the war because “the Hip Sing was
short of funds, and the On Leong short of hatchet-men.”213 These shortages made both
sides keen to broker peace.214 Additionally, several of the tongs began to face lawsuits
from bystanders injured as a result of tong battles. For example, J.W. Riggins, a grain
handler struck by a stray bullet during the June 2nd battle, sued the Suey Sing and Hop
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Sing tongs for $25,310.215 The same summer, Tony Marovich sued the Hop Sings for
$25,000 for his injuries resulting from a tong shootout.216 Finances could often be the
deciding factor in ending tong wars, at times outweighing honor and saving face.

Successfully Contesting Discrimination
As the Chinese increasingly found success in their efforts to combat
discriminatory laws and practices, the need to turn to the tongs for help diminished.
Originally created to provide aid, assistance, and protection to its members; particularly
those unable to join other family or district associations, tong membership declined as
residents succeeded without them. These victories made the changes to Chinatown
possible, as those with enough money moved out to the suburbs, often only returning to
Chinatown for celebrations and holidays. Chinese activism influenced the repeal of the
Chinese Exclusion Act, allowing for increased immigration to the United States and the
renewal of Chinese family units in greater number.
As the Chinese fought back against prejudice, they accessed greater mobility for
themselves, economically and physically. A change took place in Chinatown, as people
financially capable of leaving, moved out, and left the community for the suburbs.217
Gloria Wong remembered moving out of Chinatown to Ladd’s Addition, a Chinese
residential development in southeast Portland.218 Evelyn Low Ching also moved out of
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Chinatown as a child and into Ladd’s Addition in the 1930’s.219 The Burnside Bridge
separated Ladd’s Addition from Chinatown and when it opened, Chinese residents able to
leave, left Chinatown to live there instead.220 Gloria also recalls that her father did not
join any tong, “because of business reasons,” stating that “it was better to not join one
and not the other.” Rather than joining, he tried to stay on friendly terms with the various
tongs and associations in Chinatown.221 He worked in Chinatown, but the rest of his life
existed within a disparate community, beyond the boundaries of Chinatown. Gloria
remembers her family went into Chinatown only for celebrations and festivities. The
movement Chinese residents out of the community changed the role of Chinatown in
everyday life of Chinese residents and the insular nature of the community.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Magnuson Bill in 1943, which
repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and allowed for a return, in part, of traditional
masculinity for Chinese men. While the repeal only permitted 105 Chinese immigrants to
enter the United States each year, it did open, if marginally so, the legal immigration of a
more diverse Chinese population.222 It provided avenues for Chinese immigrants to
become naturalized citizens. This act, coupled with the War Brides Act of 1945 and 1947
allowed Chinese men serving in the United States military to bring wives and children
into the country. The Confucian order, once upset by the gender disparities in Chinatown,
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returned, as many men found opportunities to fulfill roles as husbands and fathers.223 The
opening of immigration to the United States also brought in a greater number and variety
of Chinese immigrants. Referred to as the second wave of Chinese immigration, many
students entered the United States during the latter half of the twentieth century, with
their entrance the typecast of the “model minority” replaced many of the negative
stereotypes earlier in the century.224
As tong influenced declined, residents’ loyalty to China became more important
within Chinatowns. Many residents of Chinatown continued to view themselves as
patriots of China. In the Chinese Language School Quarterly, Portland resident Wong
Wei-chen explained the community’s commercial connections with China and argued
that the 1925 Portland Exposition presented an opportunity to further develop both.225 In
1921, Chen Ming-tai wrote about the Portland Chinese and development of the
community. He described China as “our nation” and its economy as “our nation’s
commerce.”226 He emphasized all Chinese as citizens of China, simply living abroad, and
the need to keep their nation’s interests in mind as they seek to develop economically.
This worldview remained prominent in Chinatown throughout the twentieth century, but
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the population increase of American-born Chinese complicated this understanding as
more saw themselves as Americans as well.

The Evolution of Tongs
In the 1920s tongs embarked on a process that brought them closer to that of other
mutual aid societies. The creation of mutual aid groups was not unique to Chinese
immigrants. Particularly during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, mutual aid
societies proliferated across the United States. From creating a men’s club, to banding
together racial and ethnic minorities seeking protection, to assembling workers together
from suffering under miserable conditions; all of these motivated the creation of diverse
mutual aid organizations.227 From the Elks and Moose lodges, to La Alianza and Knights
of Columbus, these groups sought to improve their situations. While tongs always
contained components of a mutual aid society, as the twentieth century progressed tongs
moved away from outright violence and criminal acts and transitioned into more distinct
fraternal orders that assisted members financially and politically, rather than the earlier
focus on physical protection.
The uniformity of tong organization was lost during the twentieth century as tongs
changed and took on different goals, resulting in dissimilar groups. The altered nature of
tongs is evident in the decision of several tongs to change the English transition of their
names during the mid-twentieth century. Both the On Leongs and Hip Sings dropped the
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‘tong’ part of their names, replacing it with ‘association’.228 This marked a desire of the
groups to distance themselves from the public memory of tongs and tong wars from years
earlier. Many created legitimate forms of business, such as the Hip Sings, that opened an
official credit union, providing loans and financial assistance to its members.229

Contested Authority: The CCBA and Tongs in Chinatown
In many ways, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be understood
as a contest for power between the tongs and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association. During the nineteenth century, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association originally organized under the name of the Chinese Six Companies. The Six
Companies dominated Chinatown and asserted authority over the Chinese immigrants
during the mid-nineteenth century. Soon after, men joined together in the first tongs and
the struggle for control began between the two groups.
Tongs allowed for any interested man to join their ranks, regardless of status,
wealth, family name, or district ties, resulting in a rapid growth of membership.230 The
growth and the ties between them empowered the tongs as they contended with more elite
organizations like family and district associations, as well as the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association. Often, the tongs overpowered these associations, prompting
many within to join a tong for protection.231 In these ways the tongs became central
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power figures in Chinese communities during the late nineteenth century, challenging the
power of elites within the CCBA.
The struggle for power continued into the twentieth century. The CCBA inserted
themselves in tong conflicts, playing the role of mediator, along with the Chinese Peace
Society. Through this the CCBA came to be seen as essential participants in any tong
negotiation. By 1930, even tong member Eng Gong stated that peace continued only
because of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. Every Chinese resident
paid two dollars to the group and it acted as a “tribunal of justice, and is to the Chinese
what the Supreme Court is to Americans.”232
As the tongs’ influence declined, the CCBA rose again to be the center of
Chinatown. Many saw the increased role of the CCBA and the Peace Society as a boon
to Chinatown. Ta-K’uei attributed the end of tong wars to the increased role of the Peace
Society, in that it required each group in the community to contribute a substantial
amount of money to the committee and it would be “subject to confiscation should the
members of that group break the peace and make some trouble.”233
A reason for the ultimate success of the CCBA over the tongs is that all Chinese,
regardless of other associations and memberships, belonged to the CCBA.234 The CCBA
also maintained a greater uniformity between its branches than did tongs. In these ways,
the CCBA successfully reestablished itself at the umbrella organization for all Chinese
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residents in the United States. A key component that helped keep the tongs from
contesting its authority again by including tong representatives in its leadership.
However, as various groups are included in the CCBA, only members from the Lin Yan
Association and the Leun Cheung Association are eligible to become president of the
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. The CCBA reasoned the necessity of this
to prevent rival tongs from controlling the organization.235

Tongs, Triads, and Gangs
The transition of the tong into a fraternal organization that resembled many other
contemporary mutual aid societies, did not signal the end of illegal activity in
Chinatowns. Rather, it created an opening for new groups to rise up and fill the power
vacuum left by the tongs. The triads became more prominent in the United States and in
the 1950’s the Chinese gang emerged. The first Chinese street gang developed in San
Francisco, known as the ‘Bugs’ these mostly American-born Chinese quickly involved
themselves in illegal activities and business within the city.236 Gangs did not exist as
simple outgrowths of tongs, nor even the triads. These groups all viewed themselves as
separate, with distinct identities from one another. Often, they intersected and
membership in one group did not preclude joining another. For example, many gang
members associated with tongs involved in crime, such as illegal gambling. This
association ranged from some becoming members of a tong along with claiming gang
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membership to simply maintaining a relationship with tongs. Not all gangs aided tongs,
however, those that did so acted as protectors for the tongs that still maintained gambling
operations.237 In this way, the gangs introduced in the mid-twentieth century, took on
similar responsibilities and roles that tongs previously assigned to their gunmen. Even in
these groups, there is a continuance in the Chinese American tradition of belonging to
multiple associations and groups.
From the late nineteenth century into the twentieth century, tongs helped shape
Chinatowns and the lives of their members. While originally created with the intent of
providing physical and financial protection to Chinese men, tongs quickly became
involved in illegal activities. Conflicts between the tongs arose and often broke out into
physical violence and fighting between rival tongs, escalated into tong wars. However, as
Chinese residents pushed back against local discriminatory practices and federal
legislation, the influence of tongs in Chinese communities decreased. Portland’s Tong
War of 1917 reveals how power was constructed between Chinese merchants, Chinese
organizations, and the local government. This conflict shows the beginning of the tongs
changing and how they became a fraternal order, while Chinese gangs arose and took
over criminal actions in Chinatown by the mid-twentieth century.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Despite the occasional fears by Chinese residents, and the white community,
during the 1920s, the 1917 Tong War proved to be the last major conflict between tongs
in Portland. After dominating Chinatown and shaping the lives of its residents for
decades, the tongs stepped back and left a new power vacuum in the community.
However, with this power vacuum, not one specific group successfully filled it.
The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association filled a part of it, becoming the
uniting organization of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans across the United
States. Most importantly, the individual members of the community filled the power
vacuum left by the tongs, as residents succeeded in fighting against the racist hostility
that each had experienced during their life. Furthermore, residents gained a political voice
by joining or creating unions, and gained opportunities for citizenship as federal
legislation changed. A transformation occurred within Chinatown as people moved out of
the area to new neighborhoods, tourism expanded, and over time, the tong wars became
more myth than reality as the generations involved passed away.
Tongs developed during a time of intense racism and discrimination towards
Chinese immigrants. They became powerful figures in Chinatown as they promised to
protect its members, help them find employment, and acted as a family for those without.
Despite the stereotypes attached to them, tongs were more than “Chinese gangs” in the
United States. Tongs did participate in crime, particularly gambling, opium, and
prostitution. They frequently broke the law, and drew ire from newspapers and police
officers alike. However, the tongs also provided protection for its members, loaned
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money for needy affiliates, and wrestled with local officials for control of Chinatown. In
this, the tongs often acted as a political voice, interceding for Chinese residents.
Recognizing their complicated nature, one can understand that tongs, as described by
author Leong Gor Yun, “are not so black as they are painted. Not all Tong members are
crooks and racketeers. A majority of them are peace-loving and law-abiding. Chinese of
all classes join the Tongs…”238
This thesis explored the beginnings of Chinese immigration and how
discrimination led to the creation of tongs. It examined the role of tongs within
Chinatown, how tongs prevented governmental overreach in Chinatown, and how tongs
clashed with one another in tong wars. Tong wars were a common occurrence from the
1880s to 1920, but quickly fell in decline as residents pushed back against discrimination,
forcing legislative changes, that culminated in the overturn of the Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1943. This thesis expands understanding of marginalized people and their responses to
discrimination and prejudice. This project focused on Portland’s Chinatown and more
broadly the interactions between Chinatowns and government on the West Coast. Further
research is needed to explore Chinatowns in the Midwest and East Coast. Chinese tongs
require further study, as to their roles later in the twentieth century and compared to
similar groups created by other immigrant and minority populations.
Today, tong wars have disappeared, the tongs are a shadow of what they once
were, and even most Chinatowns across the United States are in decline, including
Portland’s. The old Chinatown within Portland is now a shadow of what it once was.
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Over the years, residents moved away from Chinatown for newer neighborhoods outside
the city. The growth of Portland increased real estate prices within Chinatown, making it
more expensive to live there, forcing many to leave their homes for elsewhere, and
driving numerous shops out of business. Encroachment by new businesses with no ties to
Chinatown have opened.
However, hope exists for Chinatowns as recent years have seen a new focus on
protecting and revitalizing what is left of Portland’s Chinatown. Chinatown residents,
historians, business owners, and activists have joined to create a new project, blending
the history of Chinatown with modernity. Business owner, Christopher Yen, states
“We’re trying to honor the character of this neighborhood, honor the history of this
neighborhood, but build something new and tell new stories. As a Chinese American, it
feels like important work to me and something that I’m actually, maybe, suited to do.”239
Likewise, a new museum opened its doors in 2018. The Portland Chinatown
Museum focuses on educating the public about Chinatown’s past and protect the future of
the community. Its mission statement is “Honoring Portland Chinatown’s Past,
Celebrating its Present, Helping to Create its Future.”240 Portland is a perfect example of
how conscientious citizens can help preserve historic Chinatowns, while allowing new
growth in the area. Learning about traditionally immigrant communities is important, not
only to better understand the past, but to understand how best cities and government can
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address the unique needs of immigrants and help them to integrate into the larger society.
The construction of race and the impacts that it has on society is not a relic of the past. It
continues to shape policy, both on local and federal levels. Understanding this creates
opportunities for better policy, heightened awareness of potential prejudices in
legislation, and how best to create communities and nations that serve each of its citizens
and residents with respect.
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